

SEPTEMBER 1961

CURRENT

THE SIGNIFICANT NEW MATERIAL
FROM ALL SOURCES
ON THE FRONTIER PROBLEMS OF TODAY

UNIVERSITY MICROFILMS
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ANN ARBOR MICH
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TO THE NEW READER

In the body of the magazine, all material to the right of the vertical rule is either direct quotation from or objective summary of the words of the author named in the margin.

The source is stated at the end of each item. For readers who would like to obtain full texts or subscribe to publications quoted, all sources are recapitulated in an alphabetical list which includes addresses, frequency of publication, single copy and subscription costs. This list begins on page 4.

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CURRENT'S DEFINITIONS

FRONTIER PROBLEMS are basic in the sense that they seriously affect our democratic way of life, relevant in the sense that they take into account new knowledge in the physical and social sciences, open in the sense that they involve unanswered questions.

SIGNIFICANT NEW MATERIAL contains new information or new ideas or comes from an unexpected source or provides a better way of saying something.

CURRENT'S SOURCES

Current's sources of material are all-inclusive. They cover general and special periodicals; academic journals and proceedings of learned societies; books, pamphlets and reports from commercial publishers, universities, foundations and funds, citizen organizations and special interest groups; daily and Sunday newspapers, especially editorials, columns and features; television and radio commentators, interviews, forums; government and intergovernment sources; statements of opinion leaders.

CURRENT'S AFFAIRS

Article titles in magazines tend to be—depending on the periodical—so general as to be meaningless, catchy but hyperbolic, or simply typographic embellishment. As our readers have long since discerned, our headings have another purpose. Our headings and subheadings are shorthand efforts to define a frontier problem precisely, economically and objectively. It is difficult enough to define frontier problems with unlimited numbers of words. To be confined by limited space makes it a kind of word game.

The results vary. One of our workhorse words, for example, is "emerging." Coupled with Africa, it makes a tolerable head. Emerging Africa is not very sharp but it seems the best we can do until that cauldron simmers down and we can see into it more clearly.

Emerging is the obvious way to describe lots of other places and people in the world. But it has not been so obvious that a new kind of American would have to emerge to deal with all the emerging non-Americans. This simple truth hit us in a great flash of light when we saw the title of Harold R. Isaacs' report on Operation Crossroads Africa: "Emergent Americans." But of course.

Here is an excerpt from Mr. Isaacs' introduction to his report, (see page 18) which we quote because it is the kind of perception we seek in looking for frontier problems:

"By calling them emergent Americans I do not mean to say that they are the first American generation to come out into a changing world—we have all been at that now for quite a while. But they are part of the first generation of Americans who may be fresh enough and new enough to emerge into the new world amaking along with all the other people who are emerging to make it—the yellows, browns, and blacks of the world, all the people we insistently keep thinking of as the non-whites, the non-Europeans, the non-Westerners. They are going through the experience of ceasing to be the subject peoples of the earth, while Americans and Europeans are going through the experience of ceasing to be the earth's masters.

"This involves a good deal more than the transfer of political power. It becomes also a matter of changing over everything that went with the political power that used to be—the ethnic notions, the racial notions, the views of history and of cultures, all the great host of images and self-images programmed into us from birth onward, all the patterns of thought, attitude, and relationship in which we have learned to locate other people. In some ways this is an even more massive and more complicated process of change than political or economic change because it has to take place in the minds and glands of men.

"We have been coming around only slowly to accepting the need for this kind of change, but the pace is quickening. It has begun to quicken, at last, at the summits of our national life. It has begun to shape new impulses and new frames of mind and new views of all human affairs in the minds of young people coming up into all the confusion. Since they have fewer of the old scratches on their minds—or have not been scratched quite so deeply—they have a better chance to acquire the new conceptions and self-conceptions that our times demand. They are beginning to do this. This is what makes them the emergent Americans."

Thus emerges The Emergent American as one of our frontier problems.

SIDNEY HERTZBERG

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PEACELESS COEXISTENCE

THE PLACE OF GUERRILLA WAR

The President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, in an address at the U. S. Army's Special Warfare School:

W. W. Rostow

When the Kennedy Administration came to responsibility it faced four major crises: Cuba, the Congo, Laos, and Viet Nam. "Each represented a successful Communist breaching—over the previous two years—of the Cold War truce lines which had emerged from the Second World War and its aftermath. In different ways each had arisen from the efforts of the international Communist movement to exploit the inherent instabilities of the underdeveloped areas of the non-Communist world; and each had a guerrilla warfare component. . . .

"Mr. Khrushchev, in his report to the Moscow conference of Communist parties [see *Current* February, 1961, page 37, and March, 1961, page 21], had explained at great length that the Communists fully support what he called wars of national liberation and would march in the front rank with the peoples waging such struggles. The military arm of Mr. Khrushchev's January 1961 doctrine is, clearly, guerrilla warfare.

"Faced with these four crises, pressing in on the President from day to day, and faced with the candidly stated position of Mr. Khrushchev, we have, indeed, begun to take the problem of guerrilla warfare seriously.

"To understand this problem, however, one must begin with the great revolutionary process that is going forward in the southern half of the world; for the guerrilla warfare problem in these regions is a product of that revolutionary process and the Communist effort and intent to exploit it.

"What is happening throughout Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and Asia is this: old societies are changing their ways in order to create and maintain a national personality on the world scene, and to bring to their peoples the benefits modern technology can offer. This process is truly revolutionary. . . . Individual men are torn between the commitment to the old and familiar way of life and the attractions of a modern way of life. The power of old social groups—notably the landlord who usually dominates the traditional society—is reduced. Power moves towards those who can command the tools of modern technology, including modern weapons. Men and women in the villages and the cities, feeling that the old ways of life are shaken and that new possibilities are open to them, express old resentments and new hopes.

"This is the grand arena of revolutionary change which the Communists are exploiting with great energy. They believe that their techniques of organization—based on small disciplined cadres of conspirators—are ideally suited to grasp and to hold power in these turbulent settings. They believe that the weak transitional governments that one is likely to find during this modernization process are highly vulnerable to subversion and to guerrilla warfare. And whatever Communist doctrines of historical inevitability may be, Communists know that their time to seize power in the underdeveloped areas is limited. They know that, as momentum takes hold

**Communism uses
the short run**

... and the fundamental social problems inherited from the traditional society are solved—their chances to seize power decline.

"It is on the weakest nations—facing their most difficult transitional moments—that the Communists concentrate their attention. They are the scavengers of the modernization process. They believe that the techniques of political centralization under dictatorial control—and the projected image of Soviet and Chinese Communist economic progress—will persuade hesitant men, faced by great transitional problems, that the Communist model should be adopted for modernization, even at the cost of surrendering human liberty. They believe that they can exploit effectively the resentments built up in many of these areas against colonial rule and that they can associate themselves effectively with the desire of the emerging nations for independence, for status on the world scene, and for material progress.

"This is a formidable program; for the history of this century teaches us that communism is not the long run wave of the future towards which societies are naturally drawn. On the contrary. But it is one particular form of modern society to which a nation may fall prey during the transitional process. Communism is best understood as a disease of the transition to modernization. . . .

"We, too, recognize that a revolutionary process is under way. We are dedicated to the proposition that this revolutionary process of modernization shall be permitted to go forward in independence, with increasing degrees of human freedom. We shall seek two results: first, that truly independent nations shall emerge on the world scene; and, second that each nation will be permitted to fashion, out of its own culture and its own ambitions, the kind of modern society it wants. . . .

"Our central task in the underdeveloped areas, as we see it, is to protect the independence of the revolutionary process now going forward. This is our mission and it is our ultimate strength. For this is not—and cannot be—the mission of communism. And in time, through the fog of propaganda and the honest confusions of men caught up in the business of making new nations, this fundamental difference will become increasingly clear in the southern half of the world. The American interest will be served if our children live in an environment of strong, assertive, independent nations, capable, because they are strong, of assuming collective responsibility for the peace. The diffusion of power is the basis for freedom within our own society; and we have no reason to fear it on the world scene. . . .

"The victory we seek will see no ticker tape parades down Broadway—no climactic battles, nor great American celebrations of victory. It is a victory which will take many years and decades of hard work and dedication—by many peoples—to bring about. This will not be a victory of the United States over the Soviet Union. It will not be a victory of capitalism over socialism. It will be a victory of men and nations which aim to stand up straight, over the forces which wish to entrap and to exploit their revolutionary aspirations. . . .

"The preservation of independence has many dimensions. The U.S. has the primary responsibility for deterring the use of nuclear weapons in the pursuit of Communist ambitions. The U.S. has a major responsibility to deter the kind of overt aggression with conventional forces which was launched in June 1950 in Korea. The U.S. has the primary responsibility for assisting the economies of those hard pressed states on the periphery of the Communist bloc, which are under acute military or quasi-military pressure which they cannot bear from their own resources; for example, South Korea, Viet Nam, Taiwan, Pakistan, Iran. The U.S. has a special

**The long run
must be saved**

**Guerrilla war
is an inside job**

responsibility of leadership in bringing not merely its own resources, but the resources of all the Free World to bear in aiding the long-run development of those nations which are serious about modernizing their economy and their social life. . . .

"Finally, the United States has a role to play . . . in learning to deter guerrilla warfare, if possible, and to deal with it, if necessary.

"The primary responsibility for dealing with guerrilla warfare in the underdeveloped areas cannot be American. There are many ways in which we can help—and we are searching our minds and our imaginations to learn better how to help; but a guerrilla war must be fought primarily by those on the spot. This is so for a quite particular reason. A guerrilla war is an intimate affair, fought not merely with weapons but fought in the minds of the men who live in the villages and in the hills; fought by the spirit and policy of those who run the local government. An outsider cannot, by himself, win a guerrilla war; he can help create conditions in which it can be won; and he can directly assist those prepared to fight for their independence. We are determined to help destroy this international disease; that is, guerrilla war designed, initiated, supplied, and led from outside an independent nation.

"Although, as leader of the Free World, the U.S. has special responsibilities which it accepts in this common venture of deterrence, it is important that the whole international community begin to accept its responsibility for dealing with this form of aggression. It is important that the world become clear in mind, for example, that the operation run from Hanoi against Viet Nam is as clear a form of aggression as the violation of the 38th parallel by the North Korean armies in June 1950.

"In my conversations with representatives of foreign governments, I am sometimes lectured that this or that government within the Free World is not popular; they tell me that guerrilla warfare cannot be won unless the peoples are dissatisfied. These are, at best, half truths. The truth is that guerrilla warfare, mounted from external bases—with rights of sanctuary—is a terrible burden to carry for any government in a society making its way towards modernization. As you know, it takes somewhere between ten and twenty soldiers to control one guerrilla in an organized operation. Moreover, the guerrilla force has this advantage: its task is merely to destroy, while the government must build and protect what it is building. A guerrilla war mounted from outside a transitional nation is a crude act of international vandalism. There will be no peace in the world if the international community accepts the outcome of a guerrilla war, mounted from outside a nation, as tantamount to a free election.

"The sending of men and arms across international boundaries and the direction of guerrilla war from outside a sovereign nation is aggression; and this is a fact which the whole international community must confront and whose consequent responsibilities it must accept. Without such international action those against whom aggression is mounted will be driven inevitably to seek out and engage the ultimate source of the aggression they confront. . . .

"We are up against a form of warfare which is powerful and effective only when we do not put our minds clearly to work on how to deal with it. I, for one, believe that, with purposeful efforts, most nations which might now be susceptible to guerrilla warfare could handle their border areas in ways which would make them very unattractive to the initiation of this ugly game. We can learn to prevent the emergence of the famous sea in which Mao Tse-tung taught his men to swim. This requires, of course, not

**Guerrilla war
is aggression**

merely a proper military program of deterrence, but programs of village development, communications, and indoctrination. The best way to fight a guerrilla war is to prevent it from happening. And this can be done. . . .

"I salute . . . those among you whose duty it is—along with others—to prevent [this] disease, if possible, and to eliminate it where it is imposed. I salute you as I would a group of doctors, teachers, economic planners, agricultural experts, civil servants, or those others who are now leading the way in the whole southern half of the globe in fashioning new nations and societies." (Address, U. S. Army's Special Warfare School, Fort Bragg, N. C., June 28, 1961)

THE METHOD OF GUERRILLA WAR

The Director of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, an O.S.S. guerrilla battalion commander in Burma during World War II, advocates a new formula for combating "internal war."

Roger A. Hilsman

"For effective counterguerrilla operations we need radical changes in organization, combat doctrine, and equipment. Our key units might be decentralized groups of fifty men, self-reliant and able to operate autonomously, fanned out into the countryside. The premium is on leadership, for only men of courage and great skill can make this system work. . . .

"The operational concept is as follows: A guerrilla-infested part of the country is marked off and divided into sections. Each section is patrolled by one of these units, but all are in contact with a central headquarters, which in turn has a reserve force at its disposal. Upon contacting guerrillas, a patrol alerts headquarters and adjacent patrols. As the latter converge, headquarters dispatches paratroops or helicopter transports behind the enemy, who is surrounded and destroyed. Once an area is pacified, the government consolidates its control and moves its forces on to the next section of land to be cleared. The main ingredients then are constant patrols, good communication facilities, rapid mobility, and capacity for rapid concentration. . . .

"The operations must cause minimum harm to the people, lest they become antagonistic to the government. The troops must be highly disciplined to respect civilian rights and property. . . . Cargo planes should carry in supplies, so that the forces do not have to live off the countryside. The onus for anti-civilian behavior should be diverted squarely to the guerrillas themselves. They are the ones who are compelled to take to repressive measures, seizing rice or conscripting men in their desperation. As they lose popular support, they will have nothing to fall back on as they suffer military defeats. . . .

"There are many [other] things we can do to help responsible and friendly governments attack this problem all along the line. . . . Equally important is the training of police and other forces to cope with the lesser manifestations of violence, not only in detection and surveillance but also in handling actual outbursts. We may find ourselves encouraging reformers to organize mass parties, and in certain tense circumstances we may need to help create citizens' militia forces. We are seriously interested in broadening the will and capacity of friendly governments, to augment social and political reform programs as a basis for modernization. . . . In any event the United States must be prepared to become deeply involved." (Address, Institute of World Affairs, San Diego, Cal., Aug. 10, 1961)

DIVIDED EUROPE

WHY IS BERLIN SO CRUCIAL?

A Soviet affairs expert and occasional correspondent for The Observer (London), Professor Lowenthal is now teaching at the Free University in Berlin. In a dispatch from the divided city he explains why Berlin is "the crux of the world balance of power."

Richard Lowenthal

"Why is it that the East-West conflict has once again taken its most acute form over Berlin? Why do both Premier Khrushchev and President Kennedy feel that their clash over the German capital is far more vital than their disputes about Laos or the Congo, about Iran or Cuba—even though Cuba is much closer to the shores of the United States, and Iran to the borders of Russia, than Berlin is to either? Why should the two leading world powers, at a time when both are engaged in a keen political contest for influencing the road of development of the new nations in their state of revolutionary flux, still reserve their greatest efforts and their keenest anxieties for the fate of the old European continent, where the frontiers between their respective spheres of influence have long frozen along rigid military lines?

"Why, to put it bluntly, this universal conviction that conflicts arising from revolution or civil strife in Asia, Africa or Latin America can ultimately always be confined to the dimensions of a local war, however much the great powers get involved in backing the contending parties, but that a Berlin crisis inevitably poses the risk of world war?

"There are, I believe, three main answers to this set of questions. One is that during most of the post-war period, and during the last few years in particular, the trend of development in Europe has been sharply different from that in other contested areas of the world. The second is that Europe still has a unique importance for the world balance of forces. The third is that Berlin has a unique importance for the trend of development in Europe. . . .

"While the sphere of Soviet power has . . . expanded, the power sphere of the Western colonial empires has steadily contracted. The national revolutions of the peoples emerging from colonial tutelage have generally been quite alien to Communist ideas and keen to preserve their independence from the Soviet bloc; moreover, the evolution of the foreign and domestic policies of the neutralist regimes in these new nations is still wide open. The facts of this worldwide shift in the industrial, military and political balance of power, and the apparently limitless possibilities of further change account for Premier Khrushchev's often-expressed confidence that Soviet Communism is destined to win worldwide victory without world war.

"But events in Europe have gone an altogether different way since Stalin's immediate post-war conquests were brought to a standstill by the Marshall Plan and the NATO alliance between 1947 and 1949. Non-Communist Western Europe, which includes the bulk of European industrial resources outside Russia, emerged from the post-war crisis to unprecedented prosperity and unity. The loss of huge colonial empires, which both diehard

**The Soviet
failure in Europe**

imperialists and doctrinaire Communists had believed indispensable to the West European workers' standard of living, has not prevented that standard from rising higher than ever. . . . It is many years since anybody has seriously worried about the risk of Communist revolution in the homelands of Marxism and the modern industrial working class.

"By contrast, Eastern Europe, which had Communist rule imposed on it by the Soviet army, has seen anti-Communist popular risings—in East Germany in 1953 and in Hungary in 1956—which could only be crushed by renewed Soviet military intervention; and though open revolt has since given way to resignation in most of the area, the peoples have retained the sense of living under an alien regime which they would eagerly discard if an opportunity arose. This continued popular rejection of Communist rule is most striking in East Germany, whose inhabitants have the constant opportunity of comparing their lot with that of the three quarters of the nation that are free to govern themselves in the West German Federal Republic; East Germany is today the only European state with a declining population—because two and a half million East Germans have fled. . . .

"In Europe, then, contrary to the recent trend in other parts of the world, it is the West that has proved stable and the Soviet empire that is internally unstable and on the defensive. Yet Europe remains crucial for any effort to tip the world balance of forces decisively in favor of the Soviets. Its over-all productivity is still ahead of that of Russia, and its total industrial potential comparable to that of the United States or the Soviet Union and far superior to anything yet existing elsewhere. Its cadres make it the biggest single prize in the struggle for the allegiance of mankind. Its capacity to give security and a rising standard of living to its workers under non-Communist regimes constantly refutes the claim of the Communists to speak for the industrial working class and to represent the most advanced form of economic and social organization, and causes the younger nations to doubt whether communism really is the embodiment of the new industrial society they all seek to create, or only a particularly costly and cruel form of transition to that goal, to which they may well find their own alternative.

"Hence if Premier Khrushchev wants to make good his claim that he can win the competition for the future of the world, he has to prove it in Europe: he has to cure the chronic instability of his own East European empire, and to upset the stability and prosperity of Western Europe. But nowhere is the contrast between the two sides as striking and impressive as in the heart of Europe, in Germany, where two states inhabited by people of one nation border each other—the flourishing Federal Republic and the dismal German colony of the Soviet Union. It is here, then, that the Soviets must try to force a change, and Berlin is the obvious lever. . . .

"It was in Berlin, under four-power occupation, that the first Germans got a chance to choose between East and West after the war and chose the West. It was the isolated position of the Western garrisons here, surrounded by Soviet-occupied territory, that inspired Stalin to his 1948 attempt to wreck the Marshall Plan for West European reconstruction by using the hunger blockade of Berlin's population to force the West to abandon the creation of the Federal Republic; and it was the failure of that attempt—the defeat of the blockade by the Western airlift—that marked the end of Stalin's advance in Europe and the emergence of the present contrast between its two halves. It is the decision of the people of West Berlin to link their fate to that of the Federal Republic that demonstrates what all East Germans would do if they could, and thus proves the

artificiality of the Soviet-imposed partition. It is here, where the Communist and Western regimes confront each other in a single city . . . that the inability of the Communist regime to stand the comparison of 'competitive co-existence' is most obvious to every visitor. . . .

"To end all that and reverse the situation in Germany and Europe, Premier Khrushchev has a maximum and a minimum aim. The maximum aim, proclaimed by him in November, 1958, is to remove the Western Powers from West Berlin, so as to have the 'Free City' at his mercy; but he has realized in the meantime that this cannot be achieved at a single stroke. Hence he is now concentrating on his minimum aim: to force the Western powers to recognize the East German state as permanent, and to make their own and the Berliners' future rights dependent on new agreements to be negotiated with that regime. If the West can be forced into legal recognition of East Germany, the stability of that regime will be greatly increased by the final discouragement of popular hopes for a change. At the same time, the West will lose all means of political counter-pressure against the pressure that regime can apply on surrounded Berlin, and will largely have to accept its conditions for retaining its rights of access there.

"Once the Western powers have abandoned their title to be in Berlin by right of occupation and have agreed to stay by consent of the East German government, the latter will insist on terms . . . which will make the city increasingly dependent on the East German economy—until its free self-government and the presence of the Western powers there become untenable, and the maximum aim of the Soviets is also achieved with a few years or months delay. If that happens, the West will have suffered a spectacular political and moral defeat at a crucial point, and the Soviets will have resumed the offensive in Europe—finally upsetting the balance of world power." ("The Testing Point," *Forum Service*, week of Aug. 5, 1961)

MUST BERLIN MEAN NUCLEAR WAR?

The editor of Saturday Review and National Chairman of the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy:

Norman Cousins

"The essential question facing President Kennedy—and also Chairman Khrushchev—may go even beyond the issue of national survival. That question is whether any nation has the right to engage in war against the human race in the pursuit of its national aims or needs. . . .

"How far should a nation go in upholding its national interests? What is the ultimate responsibility of an American President? Is it just to the nation? If the answer is yes, then is there anything in the history or values of that nation which connects it to a purpose or to values higher than its own welfare? What is the highest good? Does the human community have any claim on the American purpose?

"To repeat, how far should a nation go in upholding its national interests? Is a policeman justified in firing into a crowd in an effort to kill a murderer? Is any nation justified in firing into the body of humanity in an effort to kill an enemy?

"It is natural and urgent that the United States consider these questions. The United States is not just a national enterprise. It is a human enterprise. It was founded for a very special purpose. That purpose was not just to create a nation but to create a set of ideas by which free men could come into their own, the theory being that government exists in order to protect the natural rights of man.

**No extermination
without representation**

"It is not in the American grain, therefore, to take the cynical view and say that our job is to look out for ourselves and let the atomic chips fall where they may. Those who argue that moral judgments are extraneous where the national interests are concerned may have in mind the history of nations in general, but they do no particular justice to the ideological origins of this nation.

"Inevitably, it will be asked at this point whether this means that the United States has no alternative but to back down on the Berlin issue. It will be said that Mr. Khrushchev may be gambling that the United States will be unwilling to risk a nuclear showdown over Berlin; indeed, he may be counting on it. Are we therefore to become paralyzed by nuclear jitters while Mr. Khrushchev proceeds to take over place after place under the cover of our fears? On the other hand, if the Soviet knows we mean what we say when we say we will not retreat, come hell or high atomic water, may this not in fact be the only way of saving Berlin and preventing what would ultimately be a nuclear war anyway?

"This is a strong argument, but it misses two essential points.

"The first point is that it is all well and good for the United States to say we don't want to live in a world in which Berlin will fall under Communist control, to be followed, piece by piece, by most of the rest of the world. But at least let us not make decisions that affect others without consulting them. At least let there be no extermination without representation. If we believe that all men are involved in the issue over Berlin—as they may well be—then let our approach reflect that fact. Let us carry the case before the entire human community. Let us mobilize our facts in the most dramatic form in an attempt to put the potent force of world public opinion to work in the present crisis. The only thing greater than nuclear force is an aroused world conscience. And if we hold back from doing this because we have little confidence that we can persuade the majority, then there is something wrong with our moral imagination.

"The second point, closely related to the first, is that it is dangerously untrue to say that the only choices before us are national suicide or national surrender. The vital alternative is a massive attempt through the United Nations to relate the crisis of Berlin to the larger crisis facing the world. That larger crisis is represented by the absence of effective law in the relationships of nations, and the likelihood of aggression in a situation in which nations are allowed to decide for themselves what their security requires.

"Mr. Khrushchev has warned that he will not be intimidated by what the United Nations may decide. If this is the case, then this should be the central issue, rather than Berlin alone. If the Soviet wishes to take the position that it is stonily opposed to any attempt to settle differences among nations on the basis of world law and world will, then the entire human community should consider the implications of this fact. In any event, the issue of Berlin is not just whether the United States is right or the Soviet Union is right. The issue is whether the contending nations have the right to proceed without regard for the lives and opinions of others. Mankind is involved and mankind has a right to be consulted. There can be no more hideous arrogance than is represented by a policy that involves other peoples without their fullest participation in any determination.

"Not until the United Nations is made central in any attack on the Berlin problem, and not until the power of world public opinion is tapped, can we or anyone say that the only alternative to Soviet intransigence in Berlin is nuclear force." ("Berlin: No Extermination Without Representation," *Saturday Review*, Aug. 5, 1961)

COMMUNIST CHINA'S CHALLENGE

SHOWDOWN IN THE UNITED NATIONS

For the past ten years the United States has successfully barred consideration of seating Communist China in the U.N. by winning majority support for a moratorium on discussion of the matter. Professor Whitaker, after questioning ninety-six of the ninety-nine U.N. delegations, finds that at the sixteenth session of the General Assembly this autumn: 1) a U. S. move to continue the moratorium will not get a majority; and 2) more than two-thirds of the U.N. members believe that Communist China should be seated as representative of China both in the Security Council and the General Assembly.

Professor Whitaker, who has been working on his survey since September, 1960, is an associate professor of international relations at San Francisco State College, from which he has been on leave at the School of International Affairs, Columbia University.

Urban Whitaker

The full range of theoretically possible solutions to the question of which government should represent China in the U.N. would seem to be as follows—"running from the most favorable to Chiang Kai-shek to the most favorable for Mao Tse-tung:

"1) To have the Nationalists continue as the representatives of all of China;

"2) To seat both the Nationalists and the Communists as representatives of their respective entities—

a. with the Nationalists continuing on the Security Council and with both in the Assembly

b. with the Communists on the Security Council and both in the Assembly

c. with neither on the Security Council but both in the Assembly;

"3) To seat the Communists as the representatives of all of China.

"In the simplest terms the three solutions are: One China (Nationalist); two Chinas, and one China (Communist). A fourth solution should be mentioned to make the list complete. It involves self-determination for Taiwan and is called by its proponents 'One China—One Taiwan.' It would necessarily mean that the Communists would occupy the Chinese seat on the Security Council.

"It cannot be overemphasized that this is a range of *theoretically* possible alternatives. It is not a list of *politically* feasible solutions. Only after we have determined which of these alternatives we have the means to achieve is it relevant to ask which of them we prefer. Important segments of our society—at both ends of the political spectrum—have made the serious mistake of confusing the question of preference with the question of possibility. Thus many conservatives have advocated . . . a One China solution with the Nationalists on the Security Council. And some liberals have advocated the One China—One Taiwan solution with the future of Taiwan to be determined by plebiscite. In fact neither of these solutions appears to be politically possible. That does not mean, of course, that it is improper

to advocate them anyway. Under certain circumstances, however, a failure to ascertain the range of possibility before embarking on a campaign for an unattainable objective may have severe adverse results. It is so in this case. . . .

"Both those who favor a One (Nationalist) China solution and those who favor a One China—One Taiwan solution are foregoing the opportunity to influence the General Assembly's choice, which will, in fact, be between a two China solution and a One (Communist) China solution. In a word, if the U. S. continues to insist on the *status quo* we will be confronted with a One China solution and it will be the wrong China. The best that we can hope for is two Chinas and we will have to work hard even to get that.

"Theoretically there are three kinds of two China solutions, depending on whether the Nationalists, the Communists or neither one of them is granted the Security Council seat. Realistically, however, two Chinas necessarily means with Communist China on the Council. There is simply no possibility that either the Assembly or the Peking Government will ratify the *status quo* on the Council. Nor is there the slightest chance that a Charter amendment, which would be required to replace China with India, as some have proposed, could achieve the necessary unanimity of the five permanent powers. Talk of any two China policy that does not provide a Security Council seat for Peking is not only wasted—it is actually considered so absurd by most delegates that it calls into question the good faith of its proponents. . . . It is not considered amusing among the United Nations to propose that Chiang, with eleven million people (nine million of whom are not even Chinese) and 13,000 square miles of island, should be granted big power status while Mao, who rules nearly 700 million people and more than four million square miles of mainland, is merely a second China.

The "successor states" solution

"When the two China question is seriously considered there are alternative means of implementation: either by admitting one of them as a new member; or by merely declaring that they are both 'successor states' to the original member and thus do not require fresh approval. It is clear, in view of both Chinas' insistent disapproval of the two Chinas idea, that neither could be admitted as a new state so long as the other is in a position to veto. For this reason the successor states proposal appears to be the only way of getting U. N. approval of a two China solution.

"Even if this solution is accepted by the General Assembly it could not, of course, be implemented without the approval of the Chinas themselves and both have categorically rejected it. Yet there are two arguments against abandoning the idea without first giving it a full discussion in the Assembly. First, it is exclusively and unquestionably the Assembly's right to determine the conditions of representation. If either China wishes to refuse a seat offered by the Assembly, that is its right, but it is a right which does not impinge on the Assembly's right to make the offer it deems most reasonable.

"Second, the only way to test the extent of the two Chinas' unwillingness to accept dual representation is to offer it—to make it clear that they can have that or nothing. If the Nationalists accepted this offer it would maximize the pressure on the Chinese Communists to accept equal representation in the Assembly and it would minimize their chances of getting into the U. N. as the sole representative of China. Once seated under a two Chinas formula the Nationalists' seat in the Assembly would be secure whether or not the Communists refused to occupy the vacant Council seat, because the Assembly would not be likely to expel the cooperating government in favor of the recalcitrant one.

"The alternative to which the Assembly will turn if a two China policy does not succeed is the seating of Peking in place of Taipeh on a credentials vote. This can be done, however, either with or without accompanying conditions. It is the unconditional seating of the Communists which would prove the most embarrassing for the United States.

"There is a variety of conditions which might soften the blow—whether or not they are accepted by the Communists. They range from an Assembly resolution requesting the Council to admit Formosa as a new member (thus affirming the majority's belief in two Chinas *de facto* if not *de jure*) to a resolution inveighing against the use of force to settle the Formosa question.

"What the General Assembly will do will, of course, depend on many things which cannot be predicted. However . . . this is what appears most probable:

"First, even if the U. S. vigorously supports another postponement of the debate the item will be placed on the agenda early in the session. Pakistan's recent switch on the moratorium was the seventh definite change since the 1960 vote. Even assuming that there will be no other changes (though several more away from the U. S. position are strongly indicated) this would be sufficient to defeat the moratorium 41 to 40.

"Second, it will be proposed, perhaps by Indonesia this year, that the Peking Government be seated in place of the Taipeh Government.

"Third, the U. S. will insist that this question be considered 'important' under the provisions of Article 18 and that it therefore requires a two-thirds majority to pass. This U. S. move, which itself requires only a simple majority, will succeed.

"Fourth, the motion to seat Peking may win a majority but will not carry the necessary two-thirds.

"Fifth, either the Assembly will move on to consideration of a two China proposal or will assign the question to an *ad hoc* committee with instructions to report back later in the sixteenth or at the beginning of the seventeenth session.

"This estimate seems unlikely to shift in a way adverse to Peking's position. . . .

"On the other hand, it is altogether possible—most Chinese experts seem to believe that it is inevitable—that Nationalist China will veto the membership [proposal]. It is hard to estimate just how deep the reaction in Africa and Asia will be. However, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that this unpopular veto would imperil U. S. success in having the credentials question declared 'important' and thus might set the stage for the seating of Communist China this fall.

"In any case there is no longer any serious doubt about the seating of the Mainland government by 1962 at the latest.

"In summary, with a major effort the United States could get a two China resolution through the Assembly this fall. If the two China idea proves unacceptable either to the Assembly or to the Chinas, the U. N. will simply seat the Communists in place of the Nationalists either this year or, more likely, in 1962.

"The relevant question for the United States is no longer whether Communist China should be in the U. N. but how to react to the fact that she soon will be. It is now clear that the continuing U. S. insistence on the *status quo* which is unacceptable to the large majority of the United Nations is jeopardizing what little chance we may still have of keeping Formosa in the United Nations." (Address, Americans For Democratic Action Summer Workshop, Bard College, New York, Aug. 6, 1961)

THE PRESSURE OF PEOPLE AND POWER

Dr. Chandra-sekhar is director of the Indian Institute for Population Studies, author of several books on Asian demography, and editor of Population Review.

**Sripati
Chandra-sekhar**

China's current two per cent rate of population growth will possibly increase to 2.5 or even 3 per cent within a decade. With the population's youthful composition and a declining death rate, China is bound to grow by 20,000,000 annually for the next few years and could double her population in the next twenty-five.

"Can China have a billion people by 1980? Possible or probable? It is rash prophesy. Granting that this number is possible and probable, the question one might ask is what does it portend, for China's own economy, for the security of Southeast Asia, for peace in Asia, and for the free world? These are difficult but necessary questions that a student of international affairs must face sooner or later. Can China clothe, feed, house, and generally take care of her millions? Will she dump her commodities and services or export human beings? Has she any emigration outlets? Will Russia or the free world provide any outlets? If not, will China become a demographic danger spot and explode in quest of *Lebensraum*?" (*Red China—An Asian View*)

Mr. Kalb is Soviet affairs specialist for the Columbia Broadcasting System and is stationed in Moscow.

Marvin Kalb

"When China develops its own atomic bombs, the United States will have reached a crossroads in its history. . . . China has made no secret of the fact that it wishes to destroy the United States. With nuclear weapons and the possibility of implicating Russia, China may decide to force America out of the Far East. Peking feels it represents the 'middle kingdom,' and the 'middle kingdom' cannot tolerate the continued presence of American troops and influence in Korea, Formosa, Viet Nam, and Thailand. Since it is unlikely that we would simply abandon these nations, the strong possibility exists that we would be dragged into a major war against China.

"As if this prospect were not sobering enough, it should be added that this war might also involve the employment of Soviet military power. . . . We would be fighting a war on two fronts against two enemies that together seem to have the capacity to wipe the United States off the face of the map. It would be little consolation if in the process we destroyed the Soviet Union.

"If the Soviet Union managed to stay out of the war, then we would still have an extremely formidable foe in Communist China. Even if we were victorious, we would be a tired, battered nation, unable to withstand the probable economic and political assault of the Soviet Union in the rest of the world.

"So, in either case, the challenge is direct; and the challenge is mortal. Therefore, we should adopt a highly flexible foreign policy aimed at exploiting the divisive pressures in the alliance so that Moscow and Peking will be deprived of the opportunity of facing the United States as a united team. For we would be playing with our national survival if we based our policy on the assumption that Russia and China will inevitably break away from each other.

"This is a big job, since it requires the seizure of the diplomatic initiative from the Communists; but it is possible." (*Dragon in The Kremlin*)

THE EMERGENT AMERICAN

A REBIRTH OF SELF-ESTEEM

During three of the summers since 1958 groups of American college students have been taking part in an international work camp project called Operation Crossroads Africa. In the summer of 1960 Harold R. Isaacs, who has long studied the impact of people upon people, accompanied some of these groups to West Africa to learn about the effect of their encounter with emergent Africa. What he gained was an insight into a new generation he calls "emergent Americans," young persons ardently and painfully responding to a rapidly changing world. Mr. Isaacs is on the staff of the Center for International Studies at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Among his books are "Scratches on Our Minds" and "No Peace for Asia."

Harold R. Isaacs

"The experience of seeing at first hand what a 'backward' or 'under-developed' culture is like . . . was, in a way, the summer's most profound experience. It was filled not only with great discovery, but much perplexity, confusion, and some pain. It raised in many minds questions to which there are no quick answers, perhaps as yet no clear answers at all. It forced upon everyone, in an intense and concentrated way, the issue of culture and values, of what we hold and how we hold it, and how we stand, now, in relation to others.

"These, too, are matters opened by the largest aspects of our current history—the end of Western European political power in the world, the collapse of the self-serving notions of ethnic and racial superiority which were used to rationalize that power, the drive to self-reassertion by the ex-subject peoples, the revision of all power relations and all the human relations affected by them—a vast drama, full of violence and infinite complexities. These are now the great affairs of men, and in West Africa last summer all the young Americans who took part in Crossroads began to share, in a small and peculiarly personal way, in this large and complicated historic experience.

"They were part of a new generation, readier than their elders to see the world with new eyes, to relate to other people in new ways. They were intent upon shedding any ethnocentrism which might have clung to them from their conditioning and schooling. They were ready to identify strongly with the emotions and aspirations of nationalist-minded Africans. They had taken on a certain humility about themselves and *their* world and were ready to 'relate' in some open, friendly, and accepting manner to whatever they might meet in the African society. . . .

"There was much that they met in West Africa to which Crossroaders reacted with strong and positive pleasure, the beauty in the countrysides, the beauty of the people and their friendly and gay warmth. They felt the great sensations of change and discovery, of seeing for themselves, of displacing fantasies with hard bits of reality, of trying to move themselves to new rhythms—the music and the dancing had a contagion even for those who could not quite tune in on it. . . . At the same time there were other aspects of West African life about which it was not always so easy to have simple or straightforward reactions.

"To begin with, these young Americans came briefly but directly to grips with the fact of *backwardness*. Our current sensitivities usually require quotation marks around that word—it is 'backwardness' or even 'so-called backwardness.' But there was nothing so-called about the hard realities of underdevelopment in what they saw, the general lack of health, the staggeringly high mortality rate among children, the lack of resources, the meagerness of the production of the means of life, the sparseness of the standard of living in its most elementary physical aspects. This was poverty, more poverty than most of them had ever seen before. . . .

Work

"In their own limited way, these young Crossroaders not only saw these things, but also experienced them. On their work projects they became themselves hewers and drawers. They worked with their hands and muscles and with simple, not to say primitive tools. . . . They had their own brief object lesson in what it means to have growth and development start from the plain ground and with little to work with besides willing but bare hands.

"There was, moreover, a question about the willingness. The Crossroads groups ran into the universal problem of differing conceptions of work. This was true not only of the African students who thought manual labor was below their dignity, but also of the ordinary villagers who generally did not believe in doing too much work at any one time. This produced much anguish in Americans brought up in the Puritan ethic and dedicated to the proposition that hard work and efficiency conquer all. . . .

"Many of the Americans became quite vocal in their criticism of African work habits and inefficiency, especially when these kept them from seeing their work projects through to conclusion. Many Africans agreed with them. Indeed, the American capacity for hard work won great admiration everywhere from Africans, who were not, however, always moved to emulate it. These were, in Africa as in other parts of the world, differences that had to do with kinds of culture and levels of development and, somewhat less visibly, with the quality of vigor and health, and this in turn had quite a bit to do with sanitation and with diet.

Sanitation

"In the cities, the Crossroaders only passed through the slums, but at their worksites they lived in or near small villages and towns where they . . . saw what living arrangements were like inside those mud huts. Some of them talked to men who had begotten up to fifteen or twenty children and had only four or six survive, and with women who carried the main burdens of keeping such families alive. Some Crossroaders traveled to more distant parts where they saw truly primitive villages where human existence was being maintained at its most minimal levels. Again, briefly and in a limited way, some Crossroaders themselves lived in conditions of rigor and non-sanitation which introduced them even more intimately to the terms of this way of life. . . . They were often dismayed and appalled not only by the filth and the disease, but by Africans who did not seem to be so dismayed or appalled themselves.

Diet and food

"The problem of diet and food became . . . one of the most difficult, contentious, and delicate problems of the whole summer. Almost every group . . . had Africans for fellow-work-campers. In some cases, cooks and cooking facilities were provided by the Africans. In others, the American group was responsible for the housekeeping arrangements, with its members taking turns at kitchen duty. In those groups I observed there was no clear settlement of the problem of menu. Where the Africans were in charge, African-style food, or some variation thereof, predominated.

Where the Americans ran their own mess, there was a greater tendency to stick to supplementary canned goods, fruit, and such other familiar items as might be locally available.

"In both cases, guilt complexes took shape, strictly among the Americans. Where Western-style food dominated, some of the Africans objected, and the Americans felt guilty about it, feeling that they were even more hopelessly culture-bound than they had feared. On the other hand, where African food was the rule, some American members made it a point of intercultural honor to get along—or at least appear to get along with what was served. This was not easy to do, for . . . the African cuisine aroused no great enthusiasm among the Americans. . . .

"Food habits are among the most deeply-ingrained of all the habits one acquires from one's culture. . . . By the same token, a violent change in food habits is one of the more 'shocking' features of what is called 'culture shock' and not many of our young Americans were quite ready to make steady fare out of the *kenke*, *fufu*, or *gary* which was set before them. . . . Confronted with African food, most of our Crossroaders did the best they could with it and then secretly or semi-secretly eked out with supplies of chocolate, tinned cheese, tinned biscuits . . . [Those] who did this, however, felt they were betraying Crossroads and Africa, not to say the United States of America. The big word was 'culture-bound' and they gave themselves a hard time with it. . . .

"The physical effects of this 'failure' were often uncomfortable and distressing but—as far as I know—minor. The psychological effects are another matter and seem to me to call for some small reflection, both as a practical problem for Crossroads and as an aspect of intercultural experience. Experimenting with a different diet is certainly part of the discovery of a foreign culture. Staying with it for any extended period of time, however, surely should be a matter of taste or necessity. . . . It is not a bad thing to be flexible about these matters, but it is absurd for anybody to feel—as some Crossroaders did—that he is a kind of ethnocentric boor because he prefers his own kind of food, or, for that matter, likes one kind and does not like another. This is partly a matter of taste, and taste is partly a matter of one's culture, and let not the emergent American be the only man so poor that he does not have, by right, a taste and a culture of his own. . . .

"Some of our Crossroaders were ready to charge themselves with food-chauvinism because they did not care to eat fermented yams and could not down some palate-burning sauce. Some of my most highly-esteemed Crossroaders looked at me askance when I said they were practicing unnecessary hair-shirtism. I think they got over it. . . .

Prometheus Culture-Bound

"Out of all the strangeness, the sparseness and the harshness of the life, all the problems of backwardness, out of the unspoken tensions, and out of past notions or emotions suddenly revived, there came unbidden thoughts into the minds of some of our Crossroaders. They began to appear in some of my conversations with some of those young men and women after we were all back from Africa. In the middle of some talk with one of them, these words suddenly came tumbling out: 'I discovered I'm a lot more culture-bound than I thought I was. The more I saw Africans, the more I couldn't help feeling that they *were* pretty backward, they were really so far behind in everything. I thought a lot about the problem of different levels of culture and tried to explain it to myself. . . .

I think I even felt uneasily that maybe in some way they *were* inferior, and this feeling worried me. Since I've been back, I have just pushed that feeling away and gone back to thinking about Africa and Africans the way I did before we went, all wonderful and exciting.'

"During the ensuing weeks, late in each interview, I repeated these remarks to dozens of Crossroaders. I asked if they thought anyone in their groups might have felt this way, or anything like it. Most of them thought someone had, or that someone might have. A few immediately nominated themselves. Whichever way they came, the answers ranged widely among a great many of the summer's hitherto unspoken thoughts. Here is a selection of examples:

"Yes, one fellow said something like this, that he couldn't help but feel that our culture is superior, just look at these people, still doing things the same way as they did hundreds of years ago. . . ."

"I don't really know. This might have run through their minds. We really didn't know about the holding of such opinions. You can't judge people by their culture. That's the way they want to live, it's their way . . . I *did* wonder why these people had lived like this for centuries, why hadn't they done things for themselves, why didn't they build that wall themselves, the wall we built. I really wondered about this. . . ."

"I don't have any problem worrying about inferiority. I don't know why the African did not advance as fast technically as the West did. I don't know the answer to this, but I am more interested in seeing things go well now for these people. . . ."

"I felt many times myself that they were inferior, and I still do. I mean at the work level, in efficiency. I don't think of any other respects. Culturally, they're just different. What is civilization? How do you judge it? All people are superior or inferior in some ways. You see a thing like this through your own values."

"There are many reasons why people are backward. One can rationalize. They have been kept down, they have been suppressed. But still, why? Why the stench, why the dirt, the offensive odors? I just couldn't adjust to them. I disliked walking through the streets and the markets. Though I appeared to like it, I never really adjusted to it."

"I don't recognize any feeling like this. Any member of our group might have felt this way. It might have been hard for some people to accept the differences, the carrying things on heads, the polygamy. Even I felt I'd rather roll things along in a wheelbarrow than carry it on my head. Inferior, yes, as far as background is concerned. Living in an advanced society is superior for me, but I didn't feel superior to any African as a person."

"Out of these answers peer some of the confusions and perplexities of the emergent American. There is no single formula for sorting them out, much less resolving them. But I believe we come here to the heart of the learning experience of these Crossroaders during their African summer. . . ."

The Making of Emergent Americans

"I have called these young men and women *emergent Americans*. I mean that they are emerging, along with most of the rest of the world, into a whole new set of tasks and relationships. They are ready to begin seeing the new shape of things on the globe and in human affairs. They carry with them a heavy burden from the past, but they are quite ready to move from new thresholds to join with other people in this difficult

business of making the world over. This is why, in essence, they found their way through Crossroads to Africa. They wanted a closer look at things that were changing. They were filled with a great wish to 'relate' to other people in a new way. They wanted to 'understand' and be 'understood' by Africans. They wanted to respect Africans. They wanted, with all their might, not to think ill of them or of their culture just because they were *different*. This was the great ethnocentric sin of the fathers and they were bent on shriving themselves of it. To this end they were ready to go just about as far as they could go in the opposite direction to accept the other fellow on his own terms.

"They succeeded to a remarkable extent. In their own modest way, they shared a new experience of contact across a pretty formidable cultural line. But in the process they also found themselves assailed by all these strong negative and rejecting views about much of what they saw and encountered. These feelings created in them a great dismay and confusion. That was why they discussed them so little or not at all among themselves. They wanted not to acknowledge them, to push them away—'I've gone back to thinking about Africa and Africans the way I did before we went, all wonderful and exciting.' In fact, the Crossroader who opened this discussion with that troubled outburst about being 'culture-bound' said to me some time later: 'You know, I think that had a little more time gone by, I never would have said what I said at all. I would have put it entirely out of my head.' But these things were and are in quite a few of these heads, and it is needful to have them out for an airing.

The Burden of Guilt

"I would begin by sorting two things out of this dismay and confusion. The first was the troubling discovery that some individuals made that negative and distasteful things could revive notions and habits of mind that they thought they had discarded forever—I even felt that maybe in some way they *were* inferior.' This was, indeed, a very dismaying thought for a Crossroader to have especially if it meant something about racial or biological inferiority. That is why it induced the guilt that led to repression and silence. If it *was* this kind of notion, it taught the individual that he could not quite discard old habits of mind, as he did old clothes. But, as everyone knows or should know by now, not facing an unbidden thought will not make it go away. I know one Crossroader who had brought himself to the edge of serious trouble because he had not, for many months, been able to talk openly about his most inward reactions to his African exposure. It had become extremely important for him to look squarely at his own feelings and to begin the process of revising them by first acknowledging what they were.

"But more commonly—and this brings me to the second point—when they uneasily faced the sensation of feeling that something African was 'inferior,' more of the Crossroaders were thinking not of race or biology, but of things that could be judged quite differently, such as levels of education and economic development, sanitation, diet, the conditions of life. The point is that by every value and standard which the American deems important, these things *are* bad, they *are* undesirable, they *are* negative, damaging to human decency and progress, and that one is entitled to think so clearly and firmly without regard to anyone's race, creed, color, or national sensitivity and, where it is important to do so, to confront the matter fairly and to speak about it plainly. This applies not only

to the 'hard' stuff of the standard of living, but to the 'soft' side as well, such matters as relationships between people, the status of women, the measure of freedom in politics.

"Over-timorousness in this respect is likely to make people forget that the emergent African feels exactly the same way about virtually all of the same things. He, too, is dedicated to wiping out poverty, raising his people up and out of the swamps of backwardness. Moreover, if he wants to carry them with him into the middle of the twentieth century, he knows that a good part of their traditional culture will have to be swept out of their way. A lot of sententious moralizing goes on about materialism and gadget culture, but I do not know of any emergent nationalist movement in Africa or anywhere else that does not say its program is to industrialize, modernize, uproot and transform. The struggle between modernism and traditionalism, between motion and stagnation, is, after all, the major content of the national and social revolutions now convulsing the greater part of the world. This is what all the shooting is really about.

"But it would be much too simple for the emergent African and the emergent American to see eye to eye, even on those things they agree about. I hope it is obvious that there are all kinds of emergent Africans and all kinds of emergent Americans, and that the whole truth is a much more complex weave than one can try to trace in a few words. But let me here stand far enough back and run the familiar risk of over-generalizing for the sake of getting an impression of what some of the over-all pattern looks like.

"The emergent African and the emergent American, I am saying, reach their near-common position from different directions and arrive there in rather different postures. This applies to more than the great questions of political method, path of change and development, kind of institutions. For the emergent American comes into this new environment with a heavy burden of guilt. He carries a share of the burden of historic responsibility for all that Western white men were and did in the world, including Africa. He carries even a larger share of guilt for those things in his own society that so directly affect his relations with the African black man. Partly this is wealth—vis-a-vis the have-nots of the world, the young emergent American feels in a way like the grandsons of the old capitalist robber barons; he has gains to redivide, old sins to expiate. But sharper and deeper than this—because hardly any Crossroader could really feel, in a personal sense, sinfully rich—is his part of the burden of American racism. This is a real burden, and he takes it upon himself, the Negro American and the white American, each in his own way. Hence he comes into his encounter with the African with the humility of a person who feels he has to prove his own bona fides.

"The emergent African, on the other hand, is a man driven most of all by the great need to reassert himself and by an unfulfilled hostility toward the Western white world which he both hates and wants to emulate. As a result, he is defensive, even about the things he is intent upon changing. He is a man who suffers from great vulnerabilities, about himself, his history, his culture, and about how all of these things have been seen in the eyes of others. Within his own walls he is full of passion to retrieve, regain, change, transform. But in this moment of his emergence, face to face with the Westerner—and especially the American—he defends it all, including everything he does not really want to defend. For this reason, his best defense, of course, is attack, and heaven knows there is enough

The merging Emergents

for him to attack. In the face of this attack, the American, full of guilt and humility, yields. He does not counter-attack because he fears that if he does, he will not show the African the respect he feels he owes him or the care for his feelings that he wants to have. The result is that he often simply accepts some self-serving African exaggerations, e.g., that all of Africa's troubles stem from colonialism, or the idea that the path to more freedom lies through less freedom, or that customs that violate his idea of the dignity and worth of the individual have to be approved just because they exist in somebody else's culture. My argument is that by this combination of impulses and surrenders, the emergent American neither wins nor relieves the African. He succeeds only in confusing and disarming himself.

A Rearrangement of Values

"It is not so much a method of counterattack that the emergent American needs but a new way of achieving a fair confrontation of values and goals between members of societies that are all in the process of change. He has to learn how to be unsparingly critical of himself without being too uncritical of others. He certainly has to reject those things in his own society which need to be rejected and changed. But he also has to be proud of those things in his society of which he has a right to be proud. The ethnocentrism of the fathers assigned all virtue to themselves, but the cultural ultra-relativism of the sons threatens to err just as badly in surrendering all virtue to others or suggesting that *anything* goes. It is a good thing to be getting rid, at last, of the ethnocentric absurdities we have inherited. But this cannot be made to mean that we also get rid of our essential commitments to our own values, our right to have our judgments about ways of life and human relations. It simply means that we have got to learn to hold these values and rights in a new way.

"This is a time when all cultures, all societies, all men are going through a time of vast change in all their mutual relationships. This means, among other things, that we are all rearranging the truths and falsities in the ways that we see each other, and ourselves. This makes for more communication between different kinds of men, but let no one think it is easier to communicate now than it was in the days when we had each other and ourselves in the fixed focus of the old power relations and the old stereotypes. Everything is blurred now, moving, changing, full of the grimaces of violence and high and deep emotion, and without symmetry, order, or sweet reason. This may be difficult and unpleasant, but that's the way it is. The problem, amid all this heaving ground, is to find the solid place that we stand on, and then to see how things look from there.

"Emergent Africans and Asians, emerging from the long epoch of their subjection, are massively engaged in re-establishing and recreating their identities, their self-respect, their self-esteem. All Western men, coming out of their long epoch of mastery, have to do likewise, for they will not simply fade away or, I hope, become subjects in their turn. The great positive achievements of Western European civilization have to be carried in some new form into the new epoch and the task of doing this now rests, for the moment, in the hands of the emergent American. To arm himself for it, what he needs most of all is to re-define, re-establish, and re-locate *his* values, *his* identity, *his* judgments—to create, in short, a new kind of American self-esteem." (*Emergent Americans: A Report on "Crossroads Africa"*)

PEOPLE VERSUS RESOURCES

THE CONTROL OF CONCEPTION

Dr. Parkes, president of Britain's Institute of Biology, a Fellow of the Royal Society, and a member of the staff of the National Institute for Medical Research in London, discusses the recent trends in birth control.

Alan Sterling Parkes

"Established methods of birth control are so crude as to be a disgrace to science in this age of spectacular technical achievement. More pertinently, they are such as to be virtually useless to those most needing assistance—illiterate and overcrowded peoples without privacy or domestic amenities. In these circumstances it is not surprising that in the last few years increasing attention has been given to the possibility of using our growing knowledge of the physiology and biochemistry of the events leading to conception to evolve better methods of preventing it.

"What is meant by 'better methods'? In a general way, an ideal method of birth control can be defined as one involving only occasional action of a simple kind. Needless to say, this goal is not yet in sight, and it is unlikely to appear as the result of some dramatic discovery. More likely, as in other branches of medical science, one approach will be superseded by another, and 'therapy' will be improved progressively. . . .

"Evidently, the difficulties are formidable, but in the West, in spite of social taboos, official caution and religious opposition, an impressive start has been made with the biological control of conception. 'The pill,' that dream of family planners, has arrived, largely owing to the efforts of Gregory Pincus, of the Worcester Foundation in the U.S.A. 'The pill' contains certain orally-active steroid substances (mainly oral progestagens, so-called from their similarity to progesterone, the hormone of the corpus luteum), which, taken by women in proper dosage according to a set regime, block ovulation (and therefore conception) by inhibiting the secretion of ovulation-producing hormone by the anterior pituitary gland. The outstanding problem of the Pincus 'pill' is not as to whether it works, but as to the extent of uncomfortable side-effects, and the possibility of danger arising from the long-term frustration of the focal gland of the endocrine system. Its general practicability is also seriously in question. It is not enough to postpone ovulation; it must be suppressed completely, and this involves extended treatment during each menstrual cycle. As a result 'the pill' is not a pill, but a multitude of pills—twenty a month during reproductive life, and one may well question the global applicability of such a method.

"What will come next? Many will think it appropriate that the male has not escaped attention altogether in anti-fertility researches, and it is now possible to inhibit the production of spermatozoa in experimental animals, without impairing sexual activity, by the oral administration of various substances at dose levels which are not otherwise toxic. Other current lines of work in this field are based on the idea of inactivating the fertilized egg or preventing it from becoming implanted in the uterus. This work is promising and raises an important matter of principle. The

Immunization against pregnancy?

Oxford English Dictionary is cautiously vague about the meaning of the word conception, but biologically there is little doubt that the word should be applied not to fertilization of the egg, but to nidation, the implantation of the fertilized egg in the uterus, which in Man takes place about a week after fertilization. (A hen is not said to conceive when her egg is fertilized, or to abort when she lays it.) On this view, contraception could properly be exercised up to the time of implantation, and would have the very great advantage of being retrospective rather than anticipatory. Ideally, a method of effecting anidation would require action only during the third week of the cycle and would prevent conception without disturbing the menstrual cycle, so that it would never be known whether or not an egg had been fertilized.

"There are other and quite different possibilities; for instance, immunization against pregnancy as against other hazards of life. This attractive and by no means new idea is based on the fact that spermatozoa are antigenic and show organ rather than species specificity, so that the serum of a rabbit injected with guinea-pig spermatozoa does not react with guinea-pig serum, but will agglutinate rabbit spermatozoa *in vitro*. The difficulty has been to obtain effective amounts of the antibody at the necessary site of action (within the female reproductive tract), and the sterilization of females by active or passive immunization against spermatozoa has still to be achieved. The possibility, however, remains and interest has been revived by the discovery that antibodies against spermatozoa can be demonstrated in one or other sex in certain cases of otherwise inexplicable sterility in human couples. The fact that such antibodies may occur in the male, as well as in the female, is of particular interest in suggesting that under certain circumstances auto- as well as iso-immunization may occur. Further study of these spontaneously-occurring conditions may make it possible to simulate them at will and so achieve the long-sought immunization against pregnancy. This possibility is of particular interest. It has usually been supposed that a method of contraception involving injection, however infrequent, would be unacceptable, and such may well be the case in the West. In the East, however, mass programs of immunization are commonplace, and contraceptive immunization . . . would probably be well received. . . .

"Such, then, are some of the more promising of current lines of research. Evidently, work must be pushed on at top speed, both *ad hoc* investigation into possible applications of existing knowledge and fundamental researches to broaden the basis of existing knowledge, and therefore the possibilities of practical application. More research workers and more facilities are needed, but these will take time to produce. In the meantime, hundreds, probably thousands, of men and women around the world are working on some aspect of reproduction and fertility and the vital clue to an improved method of controlling human fertility may come from any such work. It is most important, therefore, that all those working in this field should be contraception-conscious and should, at least from time to time, look at their results from this point of view. Further, a vital clue may come from totally unrelated work, and what applies with particular force to those working on fertility applies in some extent to all biologists. At the same time, the vast human, scientific and commercial interests at stake in this matter make it imperative that more than ordinary scientific caution should be exercised in assessing the value and applicability of work bearing directly or indirectly on the control of human fertility." ("The Menace of Over-Population," *New Scientist*, June 8, 1961)

NEIGHBORHOODS TO LIVE IN

DESIGNING HUMAN HOUSING PROJECTS

A staff consultant of the Citizens' Housing and Planning Council of New York, Inc. offers principles for designing large-scale apartment housing projects that will make cities livable for families.

Elizabeth Wood

"When the first housing architects and administrators built their first 'projects'—using superblocks—they were expressing the hope that by designing houses or residential buildings in large-scale units they could bring to city people a richer and more fulfilling environment than was possible in ordinary city blocks. . . . Although the projects spread, the hope shrivelled, so far as public housing is concerned. . . . With the advocacy of scattered buildings and individual houses, it died."

But "to abandon the large-scale planning that lies behind projects is to abandon one of the most important innovations in city development." Today, cities desperately need designs for urban residential neighborhoods—private as well as public—that can compete with the suburbs for social desirability, especially for families with children.

In public housing, a number of studies have fixed clear and adequate precepts for the design of individual dwelling units—whether in row houses, walk-ups or high-rise buildings. "What has been completely lacking is a study of design based on a theory of what kind of social structure is desirable in a project and how to use design to get it."

Design cannot do everything. For example, "the creative neighborhood must have a population which includes the middle class families who, traditionally, are local leaders and servers." [Current, May 1961, page 26.] But design of the space outside the dwelling units can perform its own magic, a magic cities badly need.

Typical high-rise public housing projects seem to have been "designed to minimize or prevent accidental and casual communication between people and the informal gathering of people, and to provide minimum facilities for the formal gatherings of people." Cost cutting led to interior corridors and lobbies of minimum size, where loitering and informal gatherings create nuisances which project employees—and policemen—are required to suppress.

Now the negative theory that it is possible to design out all opportunities for misbehavior and creating of nuisances "has been pretty thoroughly tried out. Experience has shown that one may wall up 'raping corners,' make the lobby so small and unpleasant that there is no reason for pleasant loitering, and hang up 'no loitering' signs, but what is created thereby are peopleless places, vacuums open to the public, where little boys can commit nuisances, where, at night, drunks can wander in, do the same thing and sleep their drunk off."

"Managers long ago learned that they can never hire enough janitors, policemen, guards and groundsmen to pick up after, or stop the vandalism of, a hostile or indifferent tenancy."

"In the long run, there is no substitute for the contributions that the

tenants themselves make to the welfare and economical management of a project. This report, therefore, suggests that design can facilitate the social fabric out of which tenant organization grows, and by means of it can be effective. . . .

"We believe that to seek to achieve tidiness and proper social behavior by frustrating or making impossible *any* social behavior will work no better with a community than with a small boy. . . .

Design for Social Fabric

"People begin life in a housing project in an aggregation of strangers with diverse habits, culture and background. If design is based on the theory that they want privacy above everything else, they remain strangers. Then if nasty incidents occur . . . they distrust the community. Design should help this aggregation of strangers become less strange, more familiar to each other. Out of this familiarity can come the informal communication, the informal groupings that constitute fabric."

This goal has particular relevance for families with children. It is difficult to imagine a time when New York or other large American cities will be able to house all families with children, even all middle income families, in dwellings other than high rise apartment buildings. If such buildings are indeed unfit, the problem is insoluble. But their suitability under optimum conditions has never been evaluated.

"The basic evil of high rise apartments for families is the distance they place between the mother and her children when they are playing outside the dwelling. She can keep them in the apartment with her except when she goes down with them to the playground; she can find paid supervision for them, or she can trust them to informal supervision by the people who are downstairs in the playground: janitors, groundskeepers, other mothers, older children. To the degree she does this, the children will be raised by these other people. This is one of the things the critics view with alarm.

"As a matter of fact, most mothers, even the most conscientious, trust their children to the supervision of others, including other parents they do not know personally. They trust the unknown when they have reasons such as 'the neighborhood is very nice,' 'the school has a good reputation.'

"Design for social structure is for the purpose of making it possible for mothers to entrust their children to their community. . . .

"The playground for the 5 to 12's should be close enough to the building so that mothers can overlook and they will, and yell down to their children, though that is not the prime social control intended. . . . The play-sitting areas for mothers and pre-school children should be located close to building entrances. This is for practical reasons. Mothers don't want to go far with babies and their paraphernalia. They often have to go upstairs to turn the oven off or to toilet their offspring. . . .

Design for Visibility

"When people do things outside, but so close to their dwellings that they can be identified with them, they can both see and be seen by their immediate neighbors. When one comes to have this sort of visual acquaintance, one's male neighbor is not an anonymity, an unknown male who might attack you if you met him late at night in the elevator. When you see your female neighbor doing household chores or watching her baby outside her door you get many clues as to the kind of person she is. Every row house project and every street of houses makes this kind

of visual appraisal possible. From the day a family moves into the block, neighbors make visual acquaintances and visual appraisals.

"Housing authority apartment buildings with interior corridors, where loitering is forbidden, offer no opportunity for a good look at a new neighbor, or even an old one. No architectural device can offset the unacceptable behavior of an undesirable neighbor, but it can minimize the impact. If most of one's neighbors are visibly acceptable and have a nodding acquaintance with each other, the impact of one undesirable family is diminished. It is lack of knowledge about one's neighbors that makes the impact of an undesirable one so destructive.

"It is, of course, incumbent upon management not to have concentrations of undesirable families, but it is incumbent upon architects to minimize the impact of the inevitable few undesirables.

"Apartment buildings with exterior corridors offer the same opportunity for visual acquaintanceship with visual appraisals as row houses. Mothers put their babies out, sit out, hang out baby clothes, sit with their husbands in the evenings or with other ladies in the afternoons. Design for visibility need not rob families of the privacy they should have. There are some excellent architectural solutions of this problem in public housing projects in this country.

Design for Loitering

"Design for loitering is an essential for social design.

"Even if everybody isn't lonesome, as the old sentiment would have it, a lot of people are, including, but not limited to, the old, the unemployed, the ailing and the housebound. And there are people, even urban people, who are aggressively gregarious, and must get out to be with other people.

"A lot of the lonely people are emotionally unable to get the human contacts they need by knocking on the doors of their neighbors. They are dependent on the process of loitering where people pass for these contacts. A lot of not-lonely people do not want the intrusion of the lonely people. At present the only place the lonely people may loiter is outdoors, on benches. When loitering can take place in the lobby where all the people in a building are apt to pass, the opportunity for like to meet like is enlarged, and immediate neighbors are protected from too much intrusion by the lonesome.

"Loitering where people pass is also good for the gregarious newcomer on the lookout for friends.

"Teenagers make up the biggest group of loiterers. It seems to be an urban fact that boys and girls must loiter: girls with girls, to see if they can see boys; boys with boys, to see if they can see girls; boys with girls for general purposes. If they may not loiter in acceptable places under social controls, they will loiter in unacceptable places without social controls. The scrawlings on the walls, the debris, the smoke smudges on the fire stairwells are proof of what happens in unplanned loitering places. Design for loitering by teenagers so that it is not disturbing (as it is when it takes place in small lobbies and corridors) and so that it is under a degree of social control, is about the maximum objective. To design for teenage loitering is not to say it is a good form of recreation, merely that it seems to be a fact of teenage life, and design should make the best of it. Forbidding it is not a solution. . . .

"One of the best locations for teenage loitering is the candy store at the shopping center, where they will loiter anyway. The chief concern of the project manager, when this is the plan, is to see that the candy

store owner is the right kind of person." Benches and a paved area outside the candy shop would make it appropriate for loitering on good days and for dancing on summer evenings. Nearness to the shopping center, especially to a drugstore and delicatessen open in the evening, would be clearly desirable.

Encouraging Informal Adult Groups

As Professor Robert K. Merton of Columbia University has pointed out, architects do not seem to have realized the importance of spontaneously formed relationships among three to five families, and the extent to which a community's working social organization depends upon the existence of such intermediary groups which can be bound up into larger entities, working for collective purposes.

"Design conducive to the formation of informal adult groups uses equipment that requires group use:" volleyball, horseshoes, shuffleboard and bocci courts, checker tables. The designer may not always know what kinds of games a particular population would like. But he can allocate space so that management will have a reservoir of things to give tenants when they are eager to do something for the project and themselves.

Straight rows of benches flanking wide sidewalks are useful for watchers, the timid, tired, old or sick. But they are useful only if there is activity to be watched and where pedestrian traffic is heavy.

"But benches are also gathering places. For this purpose, straight line arrangement is no more correct than straight line arrangement of furniture in a living room." There should be benches grouped around paved bays off the sidewalk, where mothers can talk to each other while their small children play in the middle of the bay, perhaps with one or two pieces of suitable play equipment. Friends and members of the family can drop off on their way from job or school and join the group.

Design for Social Controls

Constant informal social controls are a requirement of society. The mere presence of "bodies" where their absence would create a vacuum for misbehavior is not the most positive form of social control. But "obviously, if the absence of people creates hazards" in lobbies and elevators, for example, or in deserted project grounds at night, "the solution lies in the planned presence of people.

"Planning for the presence of people must capitalize on their needs and wants. People will not go or stay somewhere because you want them to. They will go only where they have to in pursuit of their daily business, or where there is something they want."

The exterior or balcony corridor generates activities—mothers playing cards, watching sunsets, airing clothes; babies sleeping and small children playing. "Exterior corridors which are not designed generously enough so that they can serve these social purposes have no excuse for existence." Windows, preferably kitchen windows, which open onto the corridors not only allow the mothers to keep an eye on their children—in traditional suburban style—but also function as symbolic social controls.

"Almost universally, lobbies are trouble spots. They are apt to be grim and institutional looking by virtue of minimum size, ugly color, no windows, total lack of adornment. But they also look scarred and beat-up from heavy traffic and misuse. . . . Too often women are afraid to come into the empty lobby alone at night. Teenagers tend to loiter there, because they have no other place to go.

"As in the case of corridors, the architect must find a design that will generate good activities and assure the presence of people who will prevent vandalism and misuse.

"Some of the needs which people would like to have served in the lobby" during the day are evident and well known. But there is also an important need to generate evening users. Facilities could include such things as chess tables and dart boards.

"For social as well as aesthetic reasons, this new kind of lobby—greatly enlarged—should have no enclosed areas; its walls should be glass, and it should be brightly lighted at night. The entire area should be visible from any spot outside the front door and within the lobby itself. . . ."

It would be a great advance "in public housing management if a dwelling unit could be provided off the lobby for an employe who (in addition to other functions) would have a generalized responsibility for keeping an eye on the lobby. The mere fact of his presence and immediate availability would be of major importance in the success of this new kind of lobby. . . .

Designing Non-residential Facilities

"The genius of good urban residential planning lies in the skill with which non-residential services are used to enrich the architectural quality of the surroundings, and the human quality of day-by-day life.

"The usual non-residential services that are an intrinsic part of residential design include primary schools, churches, community centers, recreational facilities and shops. The arrangement of these should be planned so as to get maximum value as a social resource from each of the facilities and to make the pedestrian traffic that they generate useful in itself: as entertainment for the watchers, and as social controls.

"There are two kinds of facilities that should be placed next to residential buildings: areas for mothers and small children, and play-grounds for the 5 to 12's. . . . Certain other facilities gain greatly from grouping away from the residential buildings, but within the site plan. Teenagers and adults want to go where there is life and liveliness. Most of these facilities and services cannot by themselves create either life or liveliness. Some churches and all shops want to be in the main-stream. Grouping these services makes them function better for their own purposes, and as a social facility.

"Some authorities have placed their community center in basement space, located behind an unidentifiable corner. . . . It is often placed on a peripheral street for the purpose of making it accessible to the families outside as well as inside the project. But a community center should be placed importantly. Since its traffic consists largely of children and young people, access should be along well-traveled pedestrian ways, not by-ways. This is not only to give it symbolic status, but because parents need to know that when their children go to activities after dark, they will go along lighted and traveled sidewalks.

"Commercial facilities in public housing projects (where they exist) consist, customarily, of a grocery store or supermarket, a drug store, and, at most, a handful of shops. Their locations tend to be on peripheral streets. Their windows seldom make for good window shopping. They seldom have benches or other facilities for comfortable rest and gossip. They are not designed to serve the social function which is almost their most important function.

"A great deal has been written about this social function. The role of

the candy shop owner who knows more about the teen-agers than any one else, and who can influence them better than most, has often been described. The role of the owner of the grocery store who gives a family a little bit of credit over the weekend has also been described. These and other shopkeepers play a very important role in creating warmth and neighborliness in a community. They are particularly necessary as a part of the social fabric of low-income neighborhoods.

"That there should be recreation facilities for all ages and both sexes would seem to be a truism and a standing rule for designers. It isn't. First, because of a presumed lack of money. Recreation is regarded as a frill except in the case of small children, when it is a routine. Second, most managers would rather their tenants take their recreation elsewhere on school grounds or in someone else's park. It is better for the grass. Third, recreation is thought of in terms of play or games, which call for equipment and supervision, which projects cannot afford. As a matter of fact, much of what constitutes recreation to teenagers, and most of what constitutes recreation to adults would come free, if the projects were well designed. The prevailing policy on commercial facilities has robbed us of one of the most important sources of recreation, one that would not only come free, but could yield a profit. . . .

"Drinking beer in company is recreation. Eventually public housing ethics and mores may recognize this fact, and we may be able to develop a native counterpart of the English pub, the first community facility to be provided in connection with any housing development in that country. High rent developments include a cocktail lounge without embarrassment, but the idea of including one in a public housing project is abhorrent to most administrators, and, perhaps to the critical public that likes its poor to be pure, or at least to be protected from temptation. There is reason to dislike the social by-products of this kind of commercial recreation as it functions in the slums, but realistically, some kind of acceptable substitute should be developed. . . .

"No project can be designed 'richly and imaginatively' that does not recognize the need to build in these ordinary commercial facilities. That they can be a source of great aesthetic value can be demonstrated not only in certain town centers in England and Scandinavia but also in old villages, where the shops, barely distinguishable from the cottages, architectural in design and charm, provided both delight to the visitors and usefulness to the villagers." (*Housing Design: A Social Theory*)

PATTERNS OF LEISURE

**Henri
Cartier-Bresson**

M. Cartier-Bresson, chairman of Magnum, an international photographers' cooperative, shows some Americans at rest. Books of his photographs have included "The Decisive Moment," "The Europeans," "From One China to Another," "People of Moscow," and "Dances à Bali." The photographs on the following four pages appeared in a Cartier-Bresson portfolio entitled "The Natural American" in *Holiday*, July 1961.

Winston-Salem, North Carolina

Santa Monica Pier, California


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SEE THE WESTINGHOUSE ATOMIC CITY







CHANGING SOCIAL MORES

SHOULD PORNOGRAPHY BE SUPPRESSED?

A novelist, lay analyst, and social critic condemns suppression of "hard-core" pornography as incompatible not only with artistic freedom but also with social health.

Paul Goodman

"Present thinking about obscenity and pornography is wrongheaded and damaging. In order to protect vital liberties, the higher, more intellectual courts often stand out against the police, the postmasters, and popular prejudice; yet since they don't give the right reasons, the issues are never settled. . . .

"Take the most undoubted sadistic pornography, socially worthless and sold at a criminal profit: one psychologist will say that its effects are disastrous, it causes 'sex crimes' and juvenile delinquency; yet another psychologist will flatly assert that no such connection has ever been proved, there is no clear and present danger to warrant legal action. Now in this particular difficulty, the courts seem to have a convenient out: since admittedly the dubious object has no social merit, since its associations are unsavory and the purveyor is a racketeer, why shouldn't the court go along with the censorship? No real freedom is impugned. But here is a dilemma: *what if the censorship itself, part of a general repressive anti-sexuality, causes the evil, creates the need for sadistic pornography sold at a criminal profit?* . . .

"The social question is not the freedom of a venal purveyor, though the case is always argued in his terms since he is the one brought to court; the question is whether the sexual climate of the community is being perverted by the censorship. . . .

"The notion that sexual impulse or stirring sexual impulse is a bad thing comes from an emotional climate in which it was generally agreed that it would be better if sexuality did not overtly exist, when people bathed and slept fully clothed, and a bull was called a he-cow. Then anything which was sexual in public . . . violated society's self-image and was certainly obscene. In our times such a notion cannot define obscenity. The pornographic is not *ipso facto* the obscene. As Judge Jerome Frank pointed out in 1949, 'No sane man thinks that the arousing of normal sexual desires is socially dangerous.' We live in a culture where all High Thought insists on the beauty and indeed hygienic indispensability of sexual desires, and where a vast part of commerce is busy in their stimulation." Nevertheless, Judge Frederick van Pelt Bryan, in the *Lady Chatterly's Lover* decision, equates prurience with "shameful or morbid interest in sex"; but, if the stirring of desire is defined, and therefore treated, as obscene, how can a normal person's interest in sex be anything else *but* shameful? . . .

"The fact is that our generations are living through a general breakdown of repressive defenses, increasingly accelerating; and therefore a deepening social neurosis. Freud's doctrine, let us remember, is that it is not repression (total amnesia) that causes neurosis, but the failure of repression, so that repressed contents return in distorted guise."

With expert advisors, our high courts "could try to forecast, and guide

toward, a sane sexual policy. Instead, they cling to an outmoded concept of obscenity and they prevent outmoded statutes from becoming dead letters. At the same time, they are forced to cede to changing public taste and relax standards. Now this must lead to social chaos, as we are witnessing with the pornography, for so long as the attempted repressing continues, the repressed contents must continually emerge in more and more distorted form. And of course we also get legal chaos, as the court twists and turns to avoid the outmoded statutes.

"For a writer like myself, there is a bitter irony in [a judge's] statement that the previously shocking is now acceptable. Yes it is—because Flaubert, Ibsen, and Wedekind, and Dreiser, O'Neill, and Joyce paid their pound of flesh to the censor. They opened the ever new sensibility and were punished for it. . . . The court's lagging acceptance of bygone classics for the wrong reasons makes it difficult for a living classic to be accepted and exert an influence in the living community. . . .

"What is the court's duty as I see it? To set aside the definition of pornography as obscenity—just as it set aside the doctrine of equal but separate facilities—and to clarify and further the best tendency of the sexual revolution. To call *not* obscene whatever tends to joy, love, and liveliness, including the stirring of lustful impulses and thoughts. . . .

"Let me proceed to a philosophical question . . . which is, in my opinion, even more important for our society than the sexual matter: what is the nature of speech and art? To protect their 'serious' books, the courts attempt to distinguish speech as communication of an idea or even as talking *about* a subject, from speech as an action doing something to its speaker, subject, and hearer. . . . Yet, although this is a useful distinction for some kinds of speech—e.g. scientific reporting and conscientious journalism—it simply does not apply to common speech, and it is necessarily irrelevant to art, for one essential function of art is to move the audience. . . .

"Jefferson and other revolutionaries who insisted on the Bill of Rights probably had a more risky notion of freedom of speech than our courts, as they did of political action in general. But if to them freedom of speech meant merely freedom to communicate opinions, they could not have intended the First Amendment to apply to belles-lettres at all, for the neoclassical esthetic doctrine of their time held that the function of art was to move and instruct, to instruct by moving. In . . . advance-guard art, where the artist is reaching to and vomiting up something intolerable in society, the art-act cannot help being offensive. Since the nineteenth century, the naturalists have meant to defy and shame when they stripped away the mask of hypocrisy. . . .

"Indeed, the arguments of the censoring customs officer or postmaster betoken a more genuine art-response [than those of the judges,] for they have been directly moved, although in an ignorant way, by the excitement and inner conflict of Joyce and Lawrence. Their experience is ignorant and low-grade because they are unwilling to let the sexual excitement belong to a larger world, and this is why they excerpt passages. But at least they have been made to feel that the world is threateningly sexual. . . . It is precisely the fact, the nature of things, that is obscene to the censor. . . .

"Sexual action is a proper action of art. The question is not *whether* pornography, but the quality of the pornography. . . . Let us pay attention to the classical pornography [for example, Aristophanes, Rabelais, *Tom Jones*, *Arabian Nights*, the *Decameron*, and in our times, Jean Genet,] and we shall see that it is not the case, as the court feels obliged to prove, that a work has a 'net' social use despite its sexual effect, but rather that the

**Art's function
is to move**

**Repression
supports criminals**

pornography, in a great context and spoken by a great soul, is the social use. . . .

"What the more intellectual court does do is to protect exceptional cases against vulgar prejudices and police busy-work." But this "is not enough to improve the cultural climate. In principle, the living writers are not exceptional and famous cases. . . . We are one community, and the kind of high culture we have and the kind of low culture we have are opposite faces of the same lead quarter. . . .

"We must bear in mind the remark of William Sloan of Rutgers, cited by James Kilpatrick [in *The Smut Peddlers*]: 'I am unimpressed with the record of repressive legislation in this country. The laws against narcotics, for example, are supporting a large criminal class and leading to large-scale corruption of our youth. The laws against off-track betting are supporting a large criminal class and lead directly to police corruption. No set of laws will prevent the bootlegging of pornography.' But they *will* make it profitable. When J. Edgar Hoover favors us with his periodic philippics about the frighteningly increasing rate of crime, flood of pornography, theft of autos, etc., and asks for more teeth in the laws and more money for enforcement, surely he proves too much. There is the possibility that his methods, since they do not work, might be the wrong methods. . . .

"The censorious attitude toward the magazines and pictures is part of the general censorious attitude that hampers ordinary sexuality and thereby heightens the need for satisfaction by means of the magazines and pictures. It is said that the pornography artificially stimulates, and no doubt this is true (though there is no evidence that there can be such a thing as 'too much' sex), but it is not so importantly true as that the pornography is indulged in because of a prior imbalance of excessive stimulation and inadequate discharge. Given such an imbalance, if the pornography heightens satisfaction, as it probably does in many cases, it is insofar therapeutic. This is an unpleasant picture of our country, but there is no help for it except to remedy anti-sexuality. . . . The revolution is irreversible, and the attempt to re-establish total amnesia must lead to more virulent expressions, e.g. still less desirable pornography. . . .

"Legalized pornography would, naturally, deplete the criminal market. (As Morris Ernst has speculated, the price on dirty postcards would drop from three for a dollar to three for a nickel.) In my cynical opinion, a first effect would be that the great publishers, networks, and film producers that now righteously keep their skirts clean and censor the prose and poetry of their moral and intellectual betters, would eagerly cash in. But a fairly quick effect, it is to be hoped, would be that such isolated pornography as a genre would simply become boring and diminish, just as women's short skirts today create not a flurry.

"Finally, there would be immense cultural advantages. Less embarrassment, a franker language, and a more sensual feeling would magnify and ennoble all our art and perhaps bring some life to the popular culture; and conversely, the exposure to such art would help to humanize sexuality and break down the neurotic compartment of 'mere lust.' . . .

"And not least, any social change in the direction of permissiveness and practical approval, which integrates sexual expression with other ordinary or esteemed activities of life, must diminish the need to combine sex with punishment and degradation. . . . The present attempted repression by the police, administrators, and lower courts not only must continue to fail but keeps creating the evil it combats." ("Pornography, Art & Censorship," *Commentary*, March 1961)

**Frankness would
humanize sexuality**

AMERICA'S SOCIAL FRONTIERS

THE MEDICAL HAVE-NOTS

Dr. Somers, professor of economics at Haverford College, was a member of President Kennedy's Task Force on Health and Social Security. Mrs. Somers is a consultant to the Social Security Administration.

**Herman M. Somers
and
Anne R. Somers**

"Great progress has been made in smoothing out the age-old extremes of inequality of access to medical care—thanks both to the higher and more evenly distributed incomes of the American people and to the development of new methods of financing medical care, including private health insurance, public medical care, and industrial programs. Especially since World War II the prevalence of varying 'classes' of medical care—related primarily to the income of the recipient—has rapidly diminished. The disparity between urban and rural facilities has been reduced.

"Nevertheless, significant gaps remain, and these are attracting more public concern than ever before. Poverty has not yet been eliminated. More important, the group considered 'medically indigent'—those otherwise self-supporting but who cannot provide for their medical care—is increasing, primarily because the need for, and cost of, medical care has been rising much faster than the income of many segments of the population. To compound the problem, those with low and relatively fixed incomes—the aged, farm labor, unorganized workers in small establishments, many of the self-employed—are the same people who have the least access to health insurance. Many of these cannot qualify for group insurance—the better value by far—and most cannot afford the high cost of nongroup policies." Some 49 million persons have no coverage.

"It has been said that we are creating a new hierarchy of medical care privilege wherein the controlling factor is the character of employment. The single most important determinant of access to medical care today is probably employe status. The new elite among medical consumers are those employed by large corporations or government, including the military. At the executive level, employes are often eligible for annual physical examinations at Company expense, as well as generous insurance benefits. Other workers frequently have, in addition to health insurance—paid for in whole or in part by the employer—and workmen's compensation, medical care for job-related illness or injury, first-class occupational health services, cash disability payments or sick pay, and life insurance that helps to defray the costs of terminal illness. Even these relatively privileged groups, however, are dissatisfied with their insurance coverage. The demand for more comprehensive coverage is as insistent as it is volatile.

"Conceivably, private health insurance might have been able to provide near-universal enrollment had the original Blue Cross concept of community-rating prevailed, thereby affording the financial base for underwriting the high-cost low-income groups whose insurance could not be self-sustaining. With the apparent defeat of community-rating, however, there appears no way to give insured status to the 'poor risk' except through some form of governmental action.

"With respect to the aged—about 10 per cent of the population and the largest category of 'poor risks'—there is already general agreement on the need for public action. Only the authority to collect premiums throughout the working years and spread the costs over the whole community can provide adequate paid-up coverage for the retired. As between the two most prominent proposals—1) federal-state subsidy of private insurance for the aged and 2) including health insurance for the aged within the existing Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) system—the latter appears simpler, more economical, and more equitable as well as involving less governmental intrusion in the affairs of private carriers, and greater dignity for the beneficiaries.

"If the government assumes primary responsibility for this large portion of health insurance 'have nots,' we should then be able to move on to insurance for 90-95 per cent of the population, with private insurance retaining the central and dominant role within a pluralistic system. Not that enrollment of the other 'poor risk' groups will come easily. But means are available. For example, it appears feasible to cover the short-term unemployed and disabled through extension of present employee benefits. It has been proposed that state legislation requiring health insurance coverage of all employes, modeled after workmen's compensation and temporary disability laws, might be the way to reach workers in small establishments and even farm and domestic labor.

"The problem should not be oversimplified, and we shall have to find our way toward the goal pragmatically, one step at a time. But it is clear that private health insurance can win the opportunity to provide adequate coverage for the large majority of the population only if it is relieved of the impractical burden of carrying the aged and certain other exceptionally high-cost risks. Working together, with government filling the gaps, near universal coverage for the American people probably can be achieved." (*Doctors, Patients, and Health Insurance*)

A COUNCIL OF SOCIAL VALUES

The Lucius N. Littauer Professor of Political Economy, emeritus, Harvard University, makes a proposal.

Alvin H. Hansen

"We have our Employment Act of 1946, which gave us a Council of Economic Advisors, the annual *Economic Report of the President*, and the annual *Report of the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress*. This bit of social machinery, social engineering, is of the greatest importance. I propose that we now set up, by act of Congress, a Council of Social Values.

"This act should require the President each year, aided by this council, to report to the Congress and to the people on our cultural gains and losses. The President should be required to point out how far we have fallen short, during the past year, of the goals previously proclaimed. He should be required to set forth goals for the coming year and to indicate the programs and policies necessary to achieve these goals.

"Is it not remarkable that, having reached our currently high standard of abundance with respect to material goods, we still talk and act very much as though these were our only concern? Is it not high time that we begin to devote in our State of the Union message some attention to the cultural needs of an advanced society? A Council of Social Values could help at least in some measure to redress the present unequal emphasis on material things." (*Economic Issues of the 1960's*)

MAN'S RELATIONS TO MAN

THE RIGHT NOT TO ASSIMILATE

Professor Lesser, chairman of the department of sociology at Hofstra College, Hempstead, N.Y., discusses the meaning of freedom for the American Indian who wishes to remain an Indian.

Alexander Lesser

American Indians are, of course, a reminder of a past that troubles the American conscience. "More than that, their existence as *Indians* unsettles the firm conviction that in this country, with its superior institutions, assimilation is proper and desirable and in fact an inevitable, automatic process. Why, after centuries of contact with us, should Indians still feel so separate and aloof?"

The survival of unassimilated Indian communities by the voluntary decision of their thousands of members—all U. S. born Indians have been citizens since 1924 and more than two-thirds were before then—speaks strongly for the vitality of the Indian way and the values of Indian group life. They have survived, not because of segregation, but despite generations of national effort to force assimilation upon them. For forty-seven years, until the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, the government sought to break up tribal life by ending communal land tenure and making Indians individual property owners. During the period, two-thirds of Indian-owned lands of 1887 were lost. Although few tribes wholly escaped, many resisted vigorously and have since sought to recover their lands.

How "Indian" is life in the unassimilated communities? "Measured by externals, by clothes and housing, by use of non-Indian technology and gadgets, or by ways in which many now make a living, it may appear that the people of these communities have on the whole adopted our ways. The San Carlos Apaches of New Mexico, for example, raise some of the finest American livestock for market. The Red Lake Chippewas of Minnesota ship fish by refrigerated trucks for sale in Chicago. The Sauk and Fox of Iowa make a living by working for wages among their non-Indian neighbors. Indian life has not been standing still. The Indians have been making accommodations and adjustments to our society and economy from early times, and they continue to do so.

"But modern studies of Indian communities show that adoption of the externals of American life is not neatly correlated with accompanying changes in basic Indian attitudes, mind, and personality. Feelings and attitudes, the life of the inner man, change more slowly than utilitarian features of comfort and convenience. Studies among the Cherokees of North Carolina, for example—considered one of the Five Civilized Tribes for more than a century—and among the Navajos of the Southwest reveal the same inner Indian feelings about the world and man's place in nature, the same non-competitive attitudes, the same disinterest in the American drive for progress and change. . . . They chose principally what we call material culture and technology and little of our sentiments and values and our philosophy of life.

**Other minorities
are immigrants**

"Indian non-assimilation in an America which has so largely assimilated many peoples from many lands is an anachronism only if we think of the Indians as merely one among many American minorities and if we look for the same process of cultural change and adjustment in them all."

The process going on in Indian home communities is quite different from the assimilation of other American minorities composed of immigrants. Confusion between them "may explain the confident predictions made on more than one occasion that this or that Indian community would become fully assimilated in some definite period of time. The stated period is often twenty-five years, approximately a generation. At the end of that time, however, contrary to predictions, the community is still there, as strong in numbers and as viable and unassimilated as ever. Some members may have left and chosen assimilation, but an increase of the population at home has usually more than made up for the loss. It has become increasingly probable that many of the communities that have endured are likely to be with us for a long and indefinite future unless radical or brutal measures are taken to disorganize and disperse them. We may have to come to terms with a people who seem determined to have a hand in shaping their own destiny.

"Nor is the persistence of these Indian communities in an industrialized America a wholly exceptional fact in the modern world. Communities with strong commitments to traditional ways of life are known in industrialized European areas. For example, the Keurs, in *The Deeply Rooted*, describe a traditional Drents community in the Netherlands. More striking are studies in Wales and Cumberland, close to the heart of industrial England, the original home of the Industrial Revolution. Alwyn Rees, in *Life in a Welsh Countryside*, found country neighborhood patterns of life persisting in Wales in 1940 from a pre-industrial past and, in some ways, from a more remote pastoral and tribal past. . . .

"Such obstinate endurance, with its inner resistance to engulfment by dominant but alien traditions," is a stubborn fact "of vital importance in understanding the contemporary world of many peoples and many cultures, each of which may seek from the West ways to improve standards of life, but each of which may at the same time be determined to keep an identity and tradition of its own. . . .

"Some Americans see assimilation, and ending Indian communities and special Indian status, as in the best interests of Indians. The legal forms which now safeguard the status of Indian communities are seen as restrictions or limitations of Indian activity and opportunity and not as marks of Indian freedom. . . . Such features of the trust situation as governmental control over the use and disposition of trust-protected Indian lands and other tribal assets are seen as hampering and restrictive, as undue paternalism and overprotection which increase Indian dependency and destroy Indian initiative."

But the freedom of Indians to become as non-Indian and assimilated as they wish is not an issue. "There are many who want and need the freedom to be Indian within the framework of America. For them the existence of the community to which they belong is essential to that freedom, and some defined legal status of the community is essential to its continued existence.

"The disappearance of our Indian communities by assimilation has a crucial finality that assimilation can never have for other American minorities. Irish, or German, or Scandinavian, or Italian immigrants who become assimilated can still look toward a homeland from which they came, a

**Is assimilation
the only freedom?**

viable tradition and culture which dignifies their origins. For the Indian, the tribal community is the only carrier of his tradition; if it disintegrates and disappears, his tradition becomes a matter of history, and he loses part of his identity. We are coming to know the importance of this sense of identification with a viable tradition in the meaning of Israel for many American Jews, or of the emergence of free African nations for many American Negroes.

"There is a tendency for people in the United States to think in 1961 that we may be coming of age as a people, that now we may be able to accept diversity in our midst without condescension, and that we may be ready to accept as sovereign equals the many peoples, of many races and creeds and cultures, who coexist with us in the complex modern world. Such a liberalism, however, is not yet the American mood in Indian affairs."

The sudden appearance in the last decade of a strong urge for advanced education—there were fewer than 200 Indians in college in 1950, more than 4,300 in 1959—"means, of course, that more Indian individuals may choose the path of non-tribal, assimilated life. But it also means that Indian community life will soon be in the hands of a generation of educated Indians. Some communities may choose to disband, with their members going their separate ways; others may want to carry on group life for an indefinite future period. In either case, the decision is likely to be made by informed, educated people, aware of their past and also of their possibilities in America.

"Meanwhile, the best we can do, as Felix Cohen once put it, may be 'to get out of the way' of the Indians, to stop hampering their efforts to work out their own destiny, and especially to stop trying to make them give up their Indian identity. In a world which may be moving toward greater internationalism, in which we hope that peoples, however diverse, will choose the way of democracy, we cannot avoid the responsibility for a democratic resolution of the American Indian situation. Our attitude toward the Indians, the stubbornest non-conformists among us, may be the touchstone of our tolerance of diversity anywhere." ("Education and the Future of Tribalism in the United States," *Social Service Review*, June 1961)

A reader in anthropology at the University of Western Australia discusses Australia's Aborigines, whose problems parallel those of the American Indian.

Ronald M. Berndt

"Attitudes toward Aborigines are changing, although this is much more apparent in cities and larger towns than in outback regions, where the maintenance of ideas about the inferiority of Aborigines helps to justify economic and other exploitation. This is linked to some extent with Aboriginal population density. The more numerous they are in a given area, with the exception of course of mission and government settlements, the less sympathetic local attitudes toward them are likely to be. As in the early days of settlement of this continent, the most tolerant are usually those people who have little or nothing to do with them. This underlines the principle that the more we have to do with a particular group of people, the greater the opportunities for misunderstanding and conflict. In other words, we can afford to be magnanimous when Aborigines are few in number and represent no threat to our way of life. Adult Aborigines are less frequently referred to these days by such derogatory terms as 'primitive' and 'stone age,' suggesting limited intellectual ability and adaptability, and there is greater appreciation of them as contemporary

human beings. But the question of protection is still an important one, especially where these people remain unsophisticated as far as our own way of life is concerned—as most of them still do. And further there is the fact that they are dependent, now, on European-Australians.

"Before the coming of the 'white' man, and in some parts of the continent for a long time afterwards, these Aborigines were organized independently as tribal or linguistic units. They were nonliterate, semi-nomadic hunters and food-collectors, placing little stress on the possession of material objects; their shelters were rudimentary and impermanent, their technical skills circumscribed, and they preferred to go naked. These tangible evidences of their way of living contrasted sharply with those of the intruding Europeans, who did not always look beyond them to discover that this apparent simplicity cloaked a mature and colorful, and in some cases quite complex, culture and social pattern. This was the case with their religion, their oral literature, songs, music and art and, not least, their ordering of social relationships. One would not expect most settlers in a new country to be particularly interested in such features. They would, of necessity, be more concerned with making a living, carving out a new life in a strange land. Yet this general indifference to traditional Aboriginal life has persisted up to the present. . . .

"Official policies have wavered, at a verbal level, between assimilation on one hand and integration on the other. As far as the latter is concerned, this implies some retention of Aboriginal elements, but a close approximation on most counts to the composition of the dominant group. Whether this is seen as an intermediate phase or as something of long range significance, it means that under such conditions they will remain a socially restricted group within the wider framework of our society, with the qualities of a minority. There are already a number of examples more or less like this scattered over this continent, and there are certain inherent dangers in such a situation. Such a group, for instance, is extremely vulnerable to prejudice, and discriminatory treatment and legislation. The goal of assimilation, although it is at the expense of Aboriginal traditional heritage, offers far more hope for the people concerned. For some it is close at hand, for others it is temporarily blocked, for the majority it is two to three and even more generations away.

"When we speak of the Aboriginal problem, what we really mean is the common problem of the adjustment of these people to new ways. But local situations vary, not only in the conditions which may or may not be congenial for this, but in the particular phase or phases of Aboriginal-European contact relevant to them. Furthermore, we are not dealing with a people whose ways of living were entirely the same. Although they had much in common, there was and is quite marked diversity throughout the continent. In addition, European impact has not been either simultaneous or uniform. . . . On the whole, and comparing the accomplishments in this field over the last couple of decades with what has gone before, it is quite evident that conditions have improved a great deal. People of Aboriginal origin are more assured of consideration, sympathetic treatment and informed aid. For the most part they are not viewed as equal in status to other Australians (except in isolated cases, while in others they may be considered to be so far 'outside' the wider community that such considerations do not arise). Moreover they suffer from many legal disabilities or, rather, are involved in a further range over and above those relevant to most other Australians. Nevertheless the ideal (officially sponsored) is one of eventual equality with other mem-

Integration in Australia

bers of our community. While ideals rarely coincide with actuality, it seems possible—on the face of existing conditions—that with improved education and economic security they will demand this for themselves.” (“The Status of Australian Aborigines,” *Quadrant*, Summer 1960-61)

SCHOOL SEGREGATION IN THE NORTH

Mr. Maslow is the executive director of the American Jewish Congress.

Will Maslow

“The black ghettos in northern metropolitan areas create school populations that for all practical purposes are almost completely segregated.”

What can be done about it? A forthright declaration of policy is the first step toward a solution. But “to achieve integration, school boards must seek not the token admission in ‘white’ schools of a few carefully screened Negro children but creation of heterogeneous school populations in which substantial numbers of white and Negro children are mixed. Desegregation cannot be viewed solely in terms of arbitrary Negro-white ratios but must be related to the racial composition of the area.”

The “Princeton Plan” offers “a relatively simple method of achieving integration in small towns, or even in larger areas, where a school serving a Negro area is relatively close to a school serving a white one. School authorities in Princeton, New Jersey, assigned all children in the first three grades to one school in a Negro area and the other grades to a second school outside the area, thus achieving integration.”

An “open enrollment” or “optional enrollment” policy is being tried in several cities. Philadelphia, for example, allows a child to attend any school in the city, provided the school has room after enrolling the children of the neighborhood. One advantage of such a policy is that it may discourage flight to the suburbs by white parents, who will stay in the city if they can send their children to what they regard as the best schools in the city.

New York City has adopted a variant of “open enrollment.” All pupils from designated schools with a “heavy concentration” of Negro and Puerto Rican students are given the opportunity to transfer to other schools that are utilized at less than 90 per cent of capacity. The privilege to transfer is not given on a racial or ethnic basis. “Nevertheless, the designation of predominantly Negro and Puerto Rican schools as ‘sending’ schools will mean in practice that almost all the children exercising the option will in fact be Negro or Puerto Rican.”

Another device to reduce segregation “is to locate new schools on the fringe areas of Negro concentration. These schools will then draw their population from Negro and white neighborhoods and thus avoid becoming Jim Crow or lily-white.” But this policy sometimes poses a dilemma: if rigorously applied, it would mean a refusal to replace obsolete and dilapidated schools in the heart of the black belts. What about the children in those schools? A compromise is perhaps the only solution: some new schools to replace run-down schools in the all-Negro or all-white neighborhoods, and some new schools to go up on the borders.

The “open enrollment” policies, however, are “devices to allow Negro and Puerto Rican children to avoid segregated schools. They cannot bring white children into non-white schools. . . . Voluntary techniques for transferring students are not sufficient to overcome the inexorable facts of population and geography in a huge metropolis.” (“*De Facto Public School Segregation*,” *Villanova Law Review*, Spring 1961)

CHURCH SCHOOLS AND PUBLIC FUNDS

WHICH WAY TO DIVERSITY?

Two defenders of cultural diversity discuss how it would be affected by federal aid to parochial and other private schools. Mr. van den Haag teaches sociology at New York University and the New School for Social Research in New York. Mr. Handlin is a professor of history at Harvard.

Ernest van den Haag

One objection to subsidizing private education seems to be that it is thought undemocratic. But "it is likely that the word 'democratic' here is misused to mean 'egalitarian' and perhaps also 'culturally homogeneous' and 'socially cohesive.'"

Egalitarianism is actually "of little relevance here: a subsidy to private schools is not likely to increase or spread whatever class distinctions private schooling now involves. It may diminish class distinctions by permitting poorer children to attend schools which now only the richer ones can afford. . . .

"It must be conceded that private schools contribute to cultural heterogeneity; at least that is often their purpose. I doubt that a subsidy would materially affect this. Yet, it would give moral approval—at least end opposition—to it. This seems to be the issue. . . .

"The very people who oppose help to private schools make the country ring with their complaints about 'conformity.' Aren't public schools fostering it and private schools—if only by fostering conformity to different ideas—loosening it? Shouldn't we help them because they are different? And if they weren't, what would be the basis for objection? . . .

"The secular forces of cohesion in the United States are overwhelming. It seems to me that conservation and support of what diversity of cultural tradition remains is likely now, and ultimately, to strengthen them more than insistence on further homogenization. If there is a weak spot in our cohesion, it is not our heterogeneity but our cultural homogeneity; not our religious differences, but the insufficiently transcendent nature of our cohesion, which is influenced by the American standard of living as much as by the idea of America. This is perhaps more likely to be remedied by private than by public schools." ("Federal Aid to Parochial Schools," *Commentary*, July 1961)

Oscar Handlin

Nothing in the American experience sustains the accusation that the failure to give public funds to Catholic schools unjustly subjects Catholics to a form of double taxation. The community has always assumed the responsibility for performing certain functions because they serve the welfare of the whole community, not because they serve those who pay the costs. Those who buy their own books, enter private hospitals or send their children to private schools or colleges do not thereby acquit themselves of their obligation to the community. "Nor can they call, in the name of justice, for a share of the financial resources that the government acquires to perform its own functions in the same spheres. . . .

"Now and again, some private organizations have been tempted by easy

access to the public treasury. More generally, they have preferred to allow the government to expend its funds through its own agencies, even when these agencies offered competition to the private ones. Yet the growth of state universities, public schools, and municipal hospitals did not damage private institutions. Indeed, one of the great strengths of the American republic has been the latitude of choice it offered individuals: not everything that had to be done, had to be done through the state. The capacity to choose has been an important element in keeping state power within manageable limits and in allowing diverse groups to seek their own ends in their own ways.

"In a period when the growing power of government tends to subdue differences and to subject the individual to total dependence upon the state, it is more important than ever to preserve freedom of action. And nowhere is this principle more important than in education. . . .

"Any grant of public aid, in any form whatever, diminishes the private voluntary character of the recipient. It is a well-founded principle, and one that has great merit, that the bestowal of a public privilege brings with it public responsibilities, which can only be defined by governmental authority. This has been held true of museums, housing projects, and trade unions; it would certainly be held true of schools or even churches. . . . Public aid would demand the acceptance of governmentally-defined codes of internal organization and behavior. . . .

"The alternative is far more safe and fully as feasible—to continue to depend upon the loyalty and devotion of those who have thus far been willing to sustain the private and parochial schools of the country voluntarily. The amount the Catholic bishops have requested to meet their capital needs is not out of line with that recently raised by the Ivy League colleges, and the number of potential contributors is far larger. A historian who has studied the nineteenth-century immigration to the United States is again and again impressed by the ability of humble men of low earning power to dedicate themselves to building institutions in which they really believed. . . . Religion would be making a poor bargain indeed to pay for some new buildings with the loss of some of its precious old freedom." ("Federal Aid to Parochial Schools," *Commentary*, July 1961)

SHARE COMMUNITY FACILITIES

Mr. Coughlan is a staff writer for Life.

Robert Coughlan

"The Catholic school system came into being at least in part because of Protestant transgressions against Catholic freedom of conscience. That system is now so important a part of the whole national educational apparatus that its sudden disappearance would be a crippling burden for both the public schools and for the country. It is not going to disappear, of course. But what may well happen, as a result of the steadily rising burden of taxes and the pressures of population increase, is that the Catholic educational system will gradually suffer a decline in *quality*. Overcrowded buildings, overworked teachers, inadequate resources—the damaging effects of such accumulating difficulties are familiar enough to public school PTA members. For the Catholic schools, with their smaller resources and bigger pressures, the damage is likely to be proportionately worse. Is this potential deterioration in the quality of the education of its Catholic children something the nation can afford? Can Protestants watch it happen with a good conscience?

"In that connection there is another bit of social evolution that ought to be taken into account: the partial secularization of the Catholic schools. The fact is that Catholic schools have to meet at least the same minimum educational standards that the state imposes on public schools. And the things rendered directly unto God nowadays are accomplished in quite short order, while those rendered unto Caesar take up practically the whole school day. To the question, 'To what extent are Catholic schools really "religious schools"?' many Catholic spokesmen would answer, 'Entirely,' pointing to the presence of crucifixes and other religious symbols in the classroom, to periods of religious instruction, to the whole religious 'atmosphere' of the parochial schools. But many other people would not agree. Catholic schools in fact spend nearly all their time teaching exactly the same secular subjects in the same way, generally from the same textbooks and with the same results, as do the public schools. In most schools the amount of time spent per day in the elementary grades on material that is specifically religious, let alone specifically Catholic, is about half an hour. The teaching staffs, which used to be made up almost entirely of nuns and priests, are already more than one-quarter lay teachers. In the 1970's laymen will outnumber religious teachers two-to-one.

"The fact is that the public and Catholic school systems, which were created by the forces of history, have been driven by the later forces of history into a steadily closer relationship. Today they are not really very dissimilar. If even the Supreme Court has had trouble deciding exactly what the significant differences are, may it be possible after all—if not now, then not long from now—to work out an amiable concordat between them, even to the extent of finding constitutionally viable ways of sharing some facilities, special equipment and even teachers?" ("Religion and the Schools," *Life*, June 16, 1961)

A staff writer for the educational supplement of Saturday Review:

James Cass

There have recently been several proposals "designed to preserve the principle of separation and, at the same time, provide varying degrees of aid to the parochial school system" in response to Catholic demands.

One proposal is for community educational facilities that might be shared. Under such an arrangement, "both public and parochial students would share buildings and equipment, constructed and maintained with public funds, for instruction in those areas of the school program that have no religious significance. The specific areas included might vary from community to community, but would include mathematics, the physical sciences, vocational education, physical education and athletics, and perhaps some others. Catholics would continue to support their own schools, without public funds, for instruction in areas of religious significance. . . . It has been estimated that if such a program were instituted at the high school level today, it would be possible immediately for the parochial schools to absorb all the Catholic children of secondary school age. . . .

"Scheduling problems in the public schools would be sticky, but a nation that is exploring space should not find them insuperable. The location of parochial and public schools would sometimes make for problems since they were not planned originally for such cooperative ventures, but common planning in the future could gradually eliminate the problem. More serious would be the reluctance of many Catholic educators to give up the bright vision of a complete Catholic school system serving all the children of their faith." ("Church, State, and School—1961," Education Supplement of the *Saturday Review*, July 15, 1961)

THE IMPACT OF AUTOMATION

IS RETRAINING THE SOLUTION?

A business magazine examines some of the realities of retraining workers displaced by automation.

Fortune

**The experience
of private
enterprise**

"The most fashionable remedy at the moment for depressed areas, nagging unemployment, and sagging economic growth is retraining. Republicans as well as liberal Democrats sing its praises; collective bargaining has embraced it; and in May, President Kennedy submitted a program to Congress, expected to cost \$700 million over a four-year period, to retrain and locate 800,000 unemployed workers.

"The hope is that retraining might not only relieve current unemployment but would help solve the possibly more serious manpower problems the U. S. will face in the next decade, when technological advance will demand more and more skilled workers, at the same time that it is eliminating the jobs of the unskilled. . . . With present population and job trends, a situation could develop in which a shortage of skilled workers ate into production and profits, while a growing caste of 'unemployables' on the public rolls gobbled up tax dollars and injected a troubling imponderable into the political scene. An all-out effort to uplift the whole labor force looks like the simple answer.

"But despite the high hopes and hearty testimonials it has aroused, retraining has so far proved something less than an economic Lydia Pinkham's. . . . [For example,] Pennsylvania in 1957 amended its school law to provide training at public expense for the unemployed. During the recession of 1957-58, 1,761 persons were enrolled in courses in seven subjects, 884 completed the course, and 741 of these were placed in jobs. The results are not very impressive [when] 500,000 were unemployed. . . .

"The best-publicized retraining effort to date, and the most disappointing, has been the experiment under the Armour Automation Fund. The 1959 labor contract between Armour & Co. and the packinghouse workers' unions established a \$500,000 fund to find solutions to the problems resulting from the displacement of employees. . . .

"At first, the parties to the agreement put a great deal of hope in retraining. When Armour closed its meat-packing plant in Oklahoma City, the 433 employees who were laid off were given a chance to learn new skills that would enable them to seek jobs outside the meat industry. About 170 applied. But in aptitude tests given by the Oklahoma Employment Service, only sixty were judged able to benefit from some kind of training. The rest were referred to the already overcrowded market for common labor. Those who were trained—for such jobs as typing, upholstering, beauty operation, and auto mechanics—were cast loose in the recession-hit labor market; and some of those who found jobs had to take substantial pay cuts. The results have been disillusioning for the committee. . . .

"There are some things individual companies can do, however, and many large corporations have been doing them for a long time. Where there is a constantly advancing technology, there is a continual need to

The Federal Government's experience

retrain employees for new jobs in the plant. Ford last year retrained nearly 3,000 workers to handle more advanced hydraulic and electrical equipment. In addition to its apprenticeship programs, General Motors retrains 7,200 employees a year—for example, it converts a production-assembly worker into a tool-and-die worker. I.B.M. retrains about 100,000 workers for other companies each year to operate [its] computers. . . .

"Even some small companies have their own internal retraining programs. The Xerox Corp. of Rochester, N.Y., a company with a rapidly changing product line (it makes copying machines) has launched a farsighted program. The company trains certain employees to take jobs that do not yet exist, while it is preparing to introduce new processes that will eliminate their old jobs. At an estimated cost of \$1,750 per man, the company has given a total of sixty-eight men a six-week training course in machine-shop techniques and mechanical assembly, then assigned them to temporary work until jobs developed in its fast-growing machine manufacturing or assembly departments. This training was given to men with ten or more years' seniority, who otherwise would have had to be laid off while machinists were being hired in the open labor market.

"A corporation retraining for its own needs has a relatively simple task. It knows the specific requirements of the jobs that will have to be filled, and it can carefully select the workers who seem best qualified to learn the new skills that will be needed. Public retraining programs, on the other hand, are obliged to deal with all sorts of human material and an unpredictable job market.

"Actually, the government was in the retraining business long before the current fanfare began. On a limited scale, the U. S. Office of Vocational Rehabilitation has been doing a quiet but highly successful job for forty-one years. It has retrained more than 1,200,000 workers, most of them semi-skilled or unskilled when they started. Only 25 per cent of those it accepts for training drop out before they finish, and some of these quit to take jobs. . . . The agency spends about \$2,000 to counsel, train, and place one man, and it boasts success in 75 per cent of its cases. By contrast, the Armour Fund appropriated no more than \$150 per worker.

"The Office of Vocational Rehabilitation, however, is restricted to helping the physically or mentally handicapped. Government action on a much larger scale is envisioned in the Kennedy program, which aims a broad assault at general unemployment. The program will be dealing principally with the approximately two million Americans who have been out of work sixteen weeks or more. Three out of four of these long-term unemployed did not finish high school; one in three is a worker over forty-five years of age; one in five is a Negro. . . .

"Many of the over-forty-five's are out of work because they are considered too old to be taught new techniques. Enough experience is at hand to indicate that this is largely a groundless prejudice; older workers learn more slowly, but once they have learned, their job performance often beats that of their juniors. Nevertheless, retraining the over-forty-five's will be a futile exercise unless it is coupled with a strenuous campaign to dissolve employers' prejudices. Likewise, any effort to raise Negroes out of the common-labor class will succeed only after the discriminative barriers raised by both management and labor are broken down.

"Many of the jobless Negroes and over-forty-five's are concentrated in the so-called depressed areas, where old industries have faded out. The problem here, of course, is not hiring prejudice. Several recent experiments have shown that retraining can play a positive role in reviving a community

The experience of the depressed areas

by attracting new industry. In Mount Union, Pa., under state sponsorship, 150 unemployed men were taught skills required in shoe manufacture for a shoe company, which then moved into town and employed all but ten of the newly skilled workers. Last year the Beryllium Corp. was thinking of leaving Hazleton, Pa., because of a local shortage of machinists. But under the supervision of the U. S. Bureau of Apprenticeship the community conducted a series of classes to improve the skills of journeymen machinists, and now the Beryllium Corp. has decided to stay.

"With many of the young unemployed, the problem is not merely lack of skill, but lack of basic education. The so-called 'dropout,' the boy who leaves high school before graduation, is often doomed to menial work or the dole, and he may not even be able to get anything out of training. In Cleveland, Thompson Ramo Wooldridge, Inc. recently undertook, as a public service, to give twenty of the long-term unemployed a training course to turn them into semiskilled machine operators. The men—mostly Negroes—turned out to lack rudimentary understanding of fractions or decimal points, so they could not learn simple blueprint reading. Then the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. stepped in and offered to finance a short course in simple mathematics. With fractions and decimals in hand, twelve of the twenty original trainees were able to go back to Thompson Ramo Wooldridge to continue the course. . . .

"There is also increasing awareness that something must be done about the quality of secondary education itself, particularly in the so-called vocational schools. For the most part, vocational schools fail to provide their students with marketable skills and to supply the trained workers that industry needs. Instead, they have been used largely as a dumping ground for behavior-problem cases and slow learners. . . .

"As head of the Labor Department's newly created Office of Automation and Manpower, [Seymour] Wolfbein will have a good deal to say about the Kennedy Administration's retraining program. He views the problem realistically enough to recognize that no Washington-prescribed cure-alls will do the trick. It is not simply a matter of finding out how many jobs are going begging for lack of skilled workers and then training the same number of the unskilled unemployed to fill them. As one union official puts it, 'You can't teach a meatcutter to be an electronics technician.'

"The question is rather of upgrading the labor force by small stages all along the line—teaching the ordinary laborer minor skills, equipping the semiskilled with new techniques, turning the skilled into advanced technicians and junior engineers. Even some who have been doomed as the unemployable may have a place in this scheme. Wolfbein cites the case of the restaurant chain that hired a number of men whose I.Q.'s averaged only 68 and put them to work wiping off lipstick traces that remained on glasses after they went through the automatic dishwasher. It took a bit of time, but the men learned it and became useful workers. With a little ingenuity, Wolfbein believes, industry could make use of many of the unskilled workers it now discards, by teaching them enough to climb at least one rung on the job ladder, thereby freeing better-trained workers to learn even higher skills. This method of squeezing up the work force, like toothpaste in a tube, is likely to look more attractive to corporation management if the shortage of skilled workers develops as expected.

"During the war, through sheer necessity, we became very creative in the use of people," says Wolfbein. "Here's another chance to show we've got imagination." ("The Hard Realities of Retraining," *Fortune*, July 1961)

**Retraining is
no cure-all**

THE ROLE OF SCIENCE

THE LIMITATIONS OF SCIENCE

The chairman of the department of physics at Columbia University, winner of the Nobel Prize for Physics in 1955, contends that the layman's respect for the power of science should be balanced by knowledge of its limitations (see also Current, July 1960, page 42).

Polykarp Kusch

"The lack of a sharp awareness of the limitations of science may be downright dangerous for the layman. Bombarded as he is with news of the triumphs of science, he may feel that science will solve all problems. He may believe that science can produce any miracle necessary to solve a problem, and he often attributes to science a quality of wisdom that is wholly outside of its sphere.

"There are limitations of science that should be within the immediate awareness of every man who participates in the life of a science-conditioned world. . . . Science is not a form of black magic in which it is necessary only to find the right incantation to achieve a result. . . . It is, for example, foolish to engage in a public policy that increases the radioactive burden of man's natural environment in the belief that science will inevitably find a way to protect man's genetic heritage from irrevocable damage from radiation. I do not assert that science cannot do this; I do assert that it is not known that science can do this and that we must not proceed under the assumption that it can. . . .

"An important limitation of science is that it does not, in itself, yield value judgments. Although science contributes knowledge that is indispensable in making value judgments, the excellence of a course of conduct or the wisdom of a policy are not wholly determined by a framework of knowledge. These things depend, in part, on the meaning of excellence and wisdom to the individual. . . .

"It would be dangerous to assume that science alone can produce the bases of a decision, or that it can point to the right course of action as infallibly as it can predict the occurrence of eclipses of the sun. The belief that science can generate the wisdom to solve every problem that faces man leads man to abdicate his own responsibility in forming his world.

"Finally, science alone cannot yield the good life; it alone cannot lend grace and purpose to life; and it cannot, in itself, give a quality of fulfillment to every life. . . .

"Because of the great influence that scientists, through science, have had on the course of events, and because they speak with great authority on matters within the scope of science, it is sometimes thoughtlessly assumed that they speak with equal authority on almost any subject. When scientists speak with great authority on subjects other than science, perhaps on political issues, they are speaking with an authority derived from experience and knowledge of other matters, amplified by their knowledge of science. All of us would decry the ascription to scientists of an authority that they do not possess. I doubt if we publicly state our disavowal of an unearned special authority with sufficient frequency, clarity and vigor.

We sometimes describe with the incisiveness and authority of science the technical background of important social, political or economic problems. It is not always clear when we stop speaking about matters in our own special competence and start discussing matters, perhaps with perception and understanding, that are not within the domain of science. I think that the public understanding of science would be enhanced and the public issues to which science is relevant would be much more clearly defined if we were to state with a considerable forcefulness when our statements are within the scope of science and when they are not.

"The layman should be taught to distinguish between the pronouncements of a scientist as a scientist and those he makes as an educated man of good will. In matters that are within the technical competence of science, a layman can hardly hope to dispute the scientist; but in other matters the layman may pit his judgments against those of the scientist. I think that the members of the scientific community should, through their writing, their teaching, their statements to the press, and in their conversations, strive to describe the areas of human thought in which science is supreme and those in which it is not." ("Scientists and Laymen," *The Key Reporter*, Summer 1961)

HOW BIG CAN SCIENCE GET?

Dr. Weinberg is director of the Atomic Energy Commission's Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tenn.

Alvin M. Weinberg

"When history looks at the twentieth century, she will see science and technology as its theme; she will find in the monuments of Big Science—the huge rockets, the high-energy accelerators, the high-flux research reactors—symbols of our time just as surely as she finds in Notre Dame a symbol of the Middle Ages. She might even see analogies between our motivations for building these tools of giant science and the motivations of the church builders and the pyramid builders. We build our monuments in the name of scientific truth, they built theirs in the name of religious truth; we use our Big Science to add to our country's prestige, they used their churches for their cities' prestige; we build to placate what ex-President Eisenhower suggested could become a dominant scientific caste, they built to please the priests of Isis and Osiris.

"The emergence of Big Science and its tools as a supreme outward expression of our culture's aspirations has created many difficult problems," among them these three: "First, Is Big Science ruining science?; second, Is Big Science ruining us financially?; and third, Should we divert a larger part of our effort toward scientific issues which bear more directly on human well-being than do such Big-Science spectacles as manned space travel and high-energy physics? . . .

"Since Big Science needs great public support it thrives on publicity. The inevitable result is the injection of a journalistic flavor into Big Science which is fundamentally in conflict with the scientific method. If the serious writings about Big Science were carefully separated from the journalistic writings, little harm would be done. But they are not so separated. Issues of scientific or technical merit tend to get argued in the popular, not the scientific, press, or in the Congressional committee room rather than in the technical-society lecture hall; the spectacular rather than the perceptive becomes the scientific standard. When these trends are added to the enormous proliferation of scientific writing, which largely remains unread

**Is Big Science
ruining science?**

in its original form and therefore must be predigested, . . . the line between journalism and science has become blurred. . . .

"One sees evidence of scientists spending money instead of thought. . . . In the past the two commodities, thought and money, have both been hard to come by. Now that money is relatively plentiful but thought is still scarce, there is a natural rush to spend dollars rather than thought—to order a \$100 million nuclear reactor instead of devising a crucial experiment with the reactors at hand, or to make additional large-scale computations instead of reducing the problem to tractable dimensions by perceptive physical approximation. The line between spending money and spending thought is blurring.

"Finally, the huge growth of Big Science has greatly increased the number of scientific administrators. Where large sums of public money are being spent there must be many administrators who see to it that the money is spent wisely. Just as it is easier to spend money than to spend thought, so it is easier to tell other scientists how and what to do than to do it oneself. . . .

"But it is fruitless to wring one's hands over the bad effects of Big Science. Big Science is an inevitable stage in the development of science and, for better or for worse, it is here to stay. What we must do is learn to live with Big Science. We must make Big Science flourish without, at the same time, allowing it to trample Little Science—that is, we must nurture small-scale excellence as carefully as we lavish gifts on large-scale spectaculars. . . .

"What really bothers me is the evidence that Big Science is invading the universities. One need not look far to find Bev accelerators and megawatt research reactors on many campuses. The justification for putting these devices on university campuses is that such gadgets of Big Science are now needed to perform large parts of basic research, and that basic research is best done in conjunction with education. But I think there is a very grave danger to our universities in this incursion of Big Science. A professor of science is chosen because he is extremely well qualified as a scientist, as a thinker, or as a teacher. If he becomes too involved with Big Science he will have to become a publicist, if not a journalist, an administrator, and a spender of big money. . . .

"Are there ways of bringing Big Science into the educational stream other than by converting our universities into National Laboratories? One way . . . is to strengthen the already close relationships between the government laboratories and the universities. I would go a step further and propose the creation of technical universities close to or in conjunction with the large government laboratories. One advantage of such a scheme would be that the National Laboratories have already made their peace with Big Science—the onerous housekeeping function, the layer of inevitable administrators and publicists, is already in being. Professors in such collaborating universities, who might be drawn in part, but not wholly, from the existing scientific staffs of the big laboratories, would not have to get involved so strongly in activities not related to their science as they would if they had to start Big Science from the beginning. . . .

"The present federal expenditure on research and development is \$8.4 billion, which is about 10 per cent of the federal budget, about 1.6 per cent of the gross national product. The money spent on research and development is the largest single *controllable* item in the federal budget in the sense that . . . it can be changed at the President's discretion. . . .

"The rate of change of our research and development budget, averaged over the past ten years, has been 10 per cent per year; this corresponds to

**Is Big Science
ruining us financially?**

a doubling time of seven years. Since the doubling time of the gross national product is about twenty years, at the present rate we shall be spending *all* of our money on science and technology in about sixty-five years. Evidently something will have to be done or Big Science will ruin us financially. . . .

"We have decided, though implicitly, that our military budget shall represent about 10 per cent of our gross national product. In the same way we ought soon to decide to devote a certain fraction of our gross national product to nondefense science rather than pay for each scientific expenditure on an *ad hoc*, item-by-item basis. At the moment science grows much more rapidly than does the gross national product. I suggest that we settle on some figure—say something less than 1 per cent of the gross national product—as the long-term bill for federally supported, nondefense science, and that we stick to it for a period of, say, fifteen years. Our science budget will then increase only as fast as our gross national product does, but we scientists shall have to get used to that idea.

"If we settle on an over-all science budget which is geared to the gross national product, we shall have to make choices. At present each scientific expenditure is considered separately. The merits of desirable projects are argued by interested and clever proponents, but the relative merit of a project in high-energy physics as compared to a project in space or in atomic energy is not weighed in the balance. The system works because the science budget is expanding so fast. Fortunately, the President's Science Advisory Committee and the Federal Council for Science and Technology give us a mechanism for establishing an over-all science budget and for making the hard choices when we shall have to make them. These choices, which will require weighing space against biology, atomic energy against oceanography, will be the very hardest of all to make—if for no other reason than that no man knows enough to make such comparative judgments on scientific grounds. The incentive for creating a favorable public opinion for a pet scientific project will become much greater than it now is; the dangers of creating a political 'in' group of scientists who keep worthy outsiders from the till will be severe. Nevertheless, it is obvious that we shall have to devote much more attention than we now do to making choices between science projects in very different fields.

"As an example of the kind of choice which we shall have to make, let us consider whether there are alternative scientific fields which ought to have prior claim on our resources. . . .

"It would be naive, if not hopeless, to argue that we should not use scientific achievement as a means of competing with the U.S.S.R. . . . The question is, are we wise in choosing manned flight into space as the primary event in these scientific Olympic Games? I shall argue against doing so, on three grounds—hazard, expense, and relevance. . . .

"The radiation hazard does not clearly make space an intolerable environment for man; on the other hand, it makes space a much more hostile environment than we had suspected even five years ago. That man can tramp about without shielding for extended times on the moon's surface seems to me quite unlikely. . . .

"On the basis of what we now know, manned space travel is not definitely feasible in the sense that we can now really place a firm upper limit on the cost of a round trip to the moon; the estimates of \$20 billion to \$40 billion for this mission are so large and cover so wide a range as to make the outsider doubt their validity on *a priori* grounds. . . . Because a project is very big and very expensive does not mean that [it] will be very successful.

"The other main contender for the position of Number One Event in the

**Scientific
choice should
be national policy**

scientific Olympics is high-energy physics. It, too, is wonderfully expensive . . . and we may expect to spend \$400 million per year on this area of research by 1970. The issues with which such research deals have greater scientific validity than those dealt with in the *manned* space program, but its remoteness from human affairs is equally great. It has the advantage, from our point of view, that we are ahead of the Russians in high-energy physics.

"But even if it were possible to generate around high-energy physics the same popular interest that arises naturally in connection with manned space travel, I am not persuaded that this is the battleground of choice. I personally would much rather choose scientific issues which have more bearing on the world that is part of man's everyday environment, and more bearing on man's welfare, than have either high-energy physics or manned space travel.

"There are several such areas, and we are generally very far ahead in them. The most spectacular is molecular biology—a field in which the contribution from the East is minimal. We have learned more about the essential life processes—growth, protein synthesis, and reproduction—during the past decade than during all previous history. In my opinion the probability of our synthesizing living material from non-living before the end of the century is of the same order as the probability of our making a successful manned round trip to the planets. I suspect that most Americans would prefer to belong to the society which first gave the world a cure for cancer than to the society which put the first astronaut on Mars.

"I mention also the group of economic-technical problems which arise from the increasing pressure of population on resources. Of these, nuclear energy is the best known. Here the Western lead is clear, and it is important to consolidate the lead. There are others—the problem of water, or atmospheric pollution, or of chemical contamination of the biosphere, for example. Each of these is a technical issue which can lay claim to our resources—a claim that will have to be heard when we make choices.

"But it is presumptuous for me to urge that we study biology on earth rather than biology in space, or physics in the nuclear binding-energy region, with its clear practical applications and its strong bearing on the rest of science, rather than physics in the Bev region, with its absence of practical applications and its very slight bearing on the rest of science. What I am urging is that these choices have become matters of high national policy. We cannot allow our over-all science strategy, when it involves such large sums, to be settled by default, or to be pre-empted by the group with the most skillful publicity department. We should have extensive debate on these over-all questions of scientific choice; we should make a choice, explain it, and then have the courage to stick to a course arrived at rationally.

"In making our choices we should remember the experiences of other civilizations. Those cultures which have devoted too much of their talent to monuments which had nothing to do with the real issues of human well-being have usually fallen upon bad days: history tells us that the French Revolution was the bitter fruit of Versailles, and that the Roman Colosseum helped not at all in staving off the barbarians. So it is for us to learn well these lessons of history: we must not allow ourselves, by short-sighted seeking after fragile monuments of Big Science, to be diverted from our real purpose, which is the enriching and broadening of human life." ("Impact of Large-Scale Science on the United States," *Science*, July 21, 1961)

EMERGING AFRICA

IS NÉGRITUDE RELEVANT?

The concept of *négritude* (see *Current*, September 1960, page 36)—a word coined by Martiniquese poet Aimé Césaire—is used by some African intellectuals to connote the quality of being African.

An African author (Down Second Avenue), Mr. Mphahlele teaches in the department of extra-mural studies of University College, Ibadan, Nigeria. He discusses the cultural aspects of *négritude*.

Ezekiel Mphahlele

“Having failed to make much of the ‘African Personality’ as a political concept, one is tempted to look for it in the art of Africa, as a cultural concept. But the paradox is that it is in this very area that the idea of a unified personality is so often blown to bits, precisely because of the individuality of the artist. But what about that French-speaking thing called *négritude*? . . .

“Léopold Sédar Senghor [an African poet, now President of Senegal] finds a heightened sensibility and intensity of emotion as the African’s chief psychic traits. These are supposed to spring from years of humid-tropical living and a pastoral or agricultural closeness to the soil and the rhythms of the seasons. Emotion, he claims, is at the heart of *négritude*: ‘Emotion is Negro.’ He further says that *négritude* is less a matter of theme than style—which presumably must carry the African’s alleged heightened sensibility and purple passion.

“Aimé Césaire . . . writes, for example:

*Hurray for those who never invented anything
Hurray for those who never explored anything
Hurray for those who never conquered anything
But who, in awe, give themselves up to the essence of things
Ignorant of the shell, but seized by the rhythm of things
Not intent on conquest, but playing the play of the world.*

“But surely it is the African theme that dominates here, and what is it that is so African about the style? Hear him again:

*My négritude is not a rock, its deafness hurled against the clamor of the day
My négritude is not a film of dead water on the dead eye of the earth
My négritude is neither a tower nor a cathedral
It plunges into the red flesh of the earth
It plunges into the burning flesh of the sky
It pierces the opaque prostration by its upright patience.*

“This is supposed to contain the ‘dynamic quality’ of *négritude*. Because the poem is a passionate outcry, a self-vindication, it has an intensity of style, of imagery; abstract ideas are given a concrete meaning. What is it that is proved? An intensely-conceived subject begets, or requires, intensity of style, and it even becomes unnecessary to talk about theme and style separately. What is so distinctively *négritudian* about that? Can one not find in Baudelaire an intensity to match it? . . .

“The original disciples of *négritude* must surely know that this pose or attitude they are striking flattens much of their verse by narrowing its

boundaries and restricting its emotional range to what they think is 'proper' or 'African' to feel. . . .

"The imagery in . . . [Senghor's] *New York* is most exciting at first reading. . . . Manhattan's ladies in the poem are considered 'scented crocodiles'; their 'nylon legs' and breasts 'have no sweat nor smell'; and one experiences only 'hygienic loves.' But Harlem?—

*A green breeze of corn springs up from the pavements ploughed by the naked feet of dancers
Bottoms waves of silk and sword blade breasts,
water-lily ballets and fabulous masks.*

"And then you stop and think. You feel there is an ironic twist somewhere which escapes Senghor, and with which he would have been able to reinforce his image of New York if he were not preoccupied with waving a banner. It is in the fact that Harlem, which he so adores, is really a deformed creation of New York, the ugly duckling in the family of American racial ghettos. And there are too many features that overlap between Manhattan and Harlem for the latter to be treated as a piece of Africa. . . .

"However much enchanted the Negro intellectuals might be by *négritude* as an expression of their own revulsion against the American mainstream or melting pot, the Negro artist must resolve for himself and others the problem of reconciling their desire for integration with their refusal to forgo their cultural identity (or with the white man's repudiation of their claims within the context of American culture). James Baldwin, for instance, has, after many years of self-imposed exile in France, come to recognize both the inherently alien nature of his American experience and his commitment to help the Negro people in the United States. The late Richard Wright came to very wild and irritating conclusions about Chanaians when he came to Africa and failed to put himself across. Ralph Ellison simply felt no emotional attachment to Africa. Lorraine Hansberry, like Langston Hughes, feels only a humanitarian sympathy with Africa. . . .

"The true artist takes off where slogans and catchwords stop. In South Africa, we non-whites are fashioning a proletarian culture that is a compromise between the traditional and the modern. What would be the point of moaning about 'our traditional culture,' much of which has been knocked about as a result of military conquest, economic and industrial activity, the migrant labor system which destroys communal and family life, the removal of whole communities from place to place by government decree, the conscious efforts of old-fashioned missionaries, etc.? To fight a rear-guard action by trying to revive a pure traditional culture among 5,000,000 urbanized non-whites, 3,000,000 detribalised labor tenants on white people's farms, or to arrest the situation among the remaining 3,000,000 unsettled Africans in the rural reserves, would be unrealistic—a fatal—

for our efforts to break down the present political structure.

"But the artist never waits for that political kingdom to come: he goes on creating. Our music, dancing, writing, and other arts reveal the cultural cross-impacts that have so much influenced our lives over the last 300 years; and *négritude* to us is just so much airy intellectual talk either in terms of artistic activity or as a fighting faith. It is exciting, if often excruciating, to be the meeting point of different cultural streams. If my writing shows any Africanness, it is as it should be, if my note and tone has authenticity. I take my Negroness for granted, and it is no matter for slogans. Imagine a Chinaman waking up one morning and shouting in the streets that he has discovered something Chinese in his sculpture or painting or music!" ("The Cult of *Négritude*," *Encounter*, March 1961)

Taking Negroness for granted

A British staff member of the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, writing in a Southern Rhodesian periodical, considers the political implications of *négritude*.

John Reed

"It is a statement of cultural fact that in modern Africa differences between the imposed European cultures on the level of intellectual thought at least separate more decisively than any common African heritage can unite. This could be said to disprove the existence of any reality corresponding to the ideas of *négritude*. But it could just as well be said to prove the desperate need for its existence—or for something which *négritude* itself may be the only means of bringing about.

"The movement of *négritude* is on one side a movement within the French tradition. It speaks with the language of France, and you cannot understand it unless you are willing to accept that a Frenchman, or a French-educated African, doesn't share the prejudices and assumptions which to you, an Englishman or an English-educated African, seem beyond discussion. If you bring to bear on the poetry of Léopold Sédar Senghor the criteria of a narrow if still quite fashionable Anglo-American school of criticism you will find the poetry wanting. If you assume, as English-speaking people do, that there is something very unhealthy in writers forming themselves into schools or coteries, you will regard the writers grouped around the idea of *négritude* with suspicion. If you feel that literature and politics have nothing to do with each other—that the true poet sits on the island of Majorca, and has never marked ballot paper in his life, and that the serious politician is too busy at his politics and being photographed playing the African drums to read, let alone write any books, then *négritude* from beginning to end must appear phoney. . . .

"Senghor has called *négritude* a 'true myth.' At its best, I believe, *négritude* is this. If at times it has become, or been used as a motive for invalid myth making, this does not condemn it. *Négritude* . . . comes into being with the long poem of Aimé Césaire, 'Cahier d'un Retour au Pays Natal,' published in 1939. It is about the poet's return to his native Martinique, and at the same time, his return to himself. It is about his coming to terms with both. He accepts the squalid town where he grew up, and its squalid people. He accepts what all his life he has tried to escape from—his own origins and his own true being. He rejects finally from himself his own resentment at being black. This is a profound and, essentially, a universal theme, the achievement of personal integrity and wholeness. It is connected in the poem with being black, because the Negro is despised by the rest of the world for his black skin, and so may come to despise himself for it. The only escape is for him to affirm his blackness, so that what was the symbol of rejection becomes the center of his pride. In Césaire, the concept of *négritude* emerges from intense personal experience, and emerges from the expression of this in the poetry itself. It is not a matter of self-justification but of defiant self acceptance. It scorns the self-confidence based on the glories of a real or imagined past.

"The inheritance of the Negro is the humiliation, the deprivation and the suffering he has undergone, and undergoes. Yet even in Césaire's *négritude* there are some positive elements and these appear in other writers where they are expanded to include a pride in a historical past of achievement and splendor which Césaire himself rejects. In Senghor, for example, the theme of return to a native land re-occurs. But Senghor's home is in Africa itself, and the childhood he goes to re-discover is not one of squalor and suffering, but of pastoral charm. His poetry returns again and again

The concept of Africanity

to the past of his people, a past full of dignity and dancing. This change of emphasis between Césaire and Senghor involves a change of political content. Although the experiences Césaire describes are personal, their resolution leads to a political stand.

"*Négritude* is a protest and a protest against a political condition, which Césaire calls 'colonialism,' using the word to include every form of exploitation and contempt of the Negro. This kind of *négritude* is therefore genuinely possible to all black people—to the American Negro, the West Indian and Haitian as well as the colonial African. It is essentially a revolutionary attitude. Senghor's development of *négritude*, with its emphasis on a Negro culture, continuous though weakened and suppressed by colonialism but one day to grow into something new, incorporating European elements, yet separate from Europe, obviously can have appeal only to the Negroes of Africa. Further it is not, politically, a revolutionary attitude. Towards the past it is partly, though not entirely, conservative. And Senghor's poetry, much of it written during the war, is full of a troubled love of France.

"Senghor's attitude is constructive and more apposite in many ways to the situation of the newly independent African states than to the actual struggle against colonialism. It is interesting to see how Senghor, now president of the state of Senegal, is using the idea of *négritude* today in his political thinking. It is for him the means by which Africa can unite itself—the alternative to the Ghanaian kind of Pan-Africanism, which to Senghor is deeply impractical. Africa has to create something to stand against the ideologies of the East and the West. Neutralism is insufficient, there must be a positive attitude based on African tradition, receiving from Europe, but itself choosing what it shall receive and what reject.

"*Négritude* will, however, only be one contribution to the new Africa, for Senghor in Senegal cannot help being aware of the non-Negro peoples of North Africa. There is a broader idea which he calls Africanity, 'a synthesis or rather a symbiosis of Negro-African, Berber and European contributions.' This in turn is part of human civilization, and Senghor envisages a time when all differences will disappear. The Negro must be ready by that time, with his own culture, to make his contribution to the final civilization of mankind.

"Much of this sounds mystical and embarrassing to Anglo-Saxon ears. Yet set against the rigidly political Pan-African dreams, mainly developed by English-speaking Africans, Senghor's views seem to me both wiser and more practical. Does *négritude* have a future outside former French West Africa? Can it help to bring together, as Senghor so earnestly desires, the whole of Africa, English as well as French speaking? Senghor himself seems mainly concerned at the moment with English-speaking West Africa. Has he any message for the South? In the first place we must say that almost nothing of *négritude* has penetrated down here. In the second, the immediate situation in southern Africa calls less for the kind of *négritude* we find in Senghor than for the more revolutionary kind of the 'Cahier d'un Retour au Pays Natal.' Already many of the dwellers in the locations of Johannesburg and Salisbury are almost as cut off from their traditional African past as the inhabitants of Martinique.

"Yet even revolutionary movements—perhaps especially revolutionary movements—need their myth. And the myth of *négritude* is essentially, in Senghor as well as in Césaire, a myth of the future rather than the past. We cannot build a future in Rhodesia unless we can imagine it. And to imagine it we need imagination. 'Partnership' failed perhaps as much through lack of imagination, its refusal to look forward to see what a future

of living together could be like, as through bad faith. Of course, it will only make things worse to add to our collections of imitations a pale imitation of *négritude*. *Négritude*, anyway, is hardly appropriate to Southern Rhodesia. Yet what Senghor calls Africanity, the synthesis or symbiosis of Negro-African and European contributions, must be discovered here if we are to have any future at all. We must abandon our deeply ingrained Anglo-Saxon love of cultural *laissez-faire*. . . . What we get will not be what we imagined or hoped or planned. But it may be something like it, and we cannot go on letting the future go by default in this matter, any more than in politics, where just as much as in culture, no one's intentions are ever realized. It is time to start thinking and creating. Our Africanity will not be *négritude*. But in the works of the poets and philosophers of *négritude* there is much we ought to know and which we can profitably ponder. Let me suggest a starting point. A definition of Africanity which Senghor gave early this year in a speech to the students at Achimota [Ghana]: 'the method of Europe and the modesty of Africa.' " ("The Relevance of *Négritude*," *The Central African Examiner*, June 1961)

A Soviet expert on Africa finds overtones in *négritude* which could lead to racialist attitudes towards Europeans. An ethnographer, Professor Potekhin is director of the newly-established Africa Institute of the Academy of Sciences in Moscow.

I. I. Potekhin

"Everywhere in Africa today people are speaking and writing about the 'African personality.' In these words there is deep meaning for Africans; they are the natural reaction of Africans to the contemptuous attitude of the colonialists. A section of the African intelligentsia, mainly in the French Community countries, prefer the term *négritude*; this is in essence an expression of the same noble desire to restore the human rights of the African. . . . However, the term *négritude* cannot be considered a happy one. It does not apply to all the peoples of Africa, but only to peoples of Negroid race, although in Africa live peoples of other races—Moroccans, Egyptians, Ethiopians and others. *Négritude* also suggests the unity of the Negroid peoples of Africa with the Negroes of America. There is indeed a certain community of interest between the two, deriving from their common experience of racial discrimination everywhere beyond the bounds of the socialist system. . . . The first Pan-African conferences were in essence Pan-Negro, and the American Negro William Dubois is the patriarch of Pan-Africanism. But it is obvious that the fight against colonialism demands a unity of all the peoples of Africa, of whatever race, and not only the unity of the peoples of Negroid race. . . .

"The term *négritude* is sometimes interpreted as meaning that all Negroes everywhere have a common psychological cast of mind and a single world outlook and ideology; this means that it is not a man's social milieu or way of life that makes him think as he does, but the color of his skin. But this is a form of racialism which can be used by the opponents of peaceful coexistence to bring the black and white races into conflict. It can become a source of extreme forms of nationalism. However, Africans themselves do not attach such a sense to the term *négritude*. Progressive people of Africa do not confuse peoples of white race with the colonialist aristocracy. They know very well that African peoples always had friends in countries inhabited by peoples of white race. In the fight against colonialism the African peoples were never alone." (*Afrika Smotrit v Budushcheye* [Africa Looks Ahead] as abridged in *Africa's Future: The Soviet View*)

WHAT ALTERNATIVE TO COMMUNISM?

Each month Current publishes a document that seems of outstanding interest to its editors.

This month we publish verbatim extracts from an essay in the Columbia University Forum, Summer 1961, which questions the assumption that democracy can be the only alternative to communism. Dr. Niebuhr is vice president of the Union Theological Seminary and a research associate at Columbia University's Institute of War and Peace Studies.

Reinhold Niebuhr

For the "Free World," democracy is the normative concept of government. But democracy is not an easily attainable form of government. As more and more nations achieve independence, and at all stages of cultural and economic development, the question arises whether we of the "Free World" have not regarded democracy as too simply and generally an alternative to communism in all nations and cultures. Democratic self-government is indeed an ultimate ideal of political community. But it is of the greatest importance that we realize that the resources for its effective functioning are not available to many nations.

It is our common assumption that political freedom is a simple *summum bonum*. It is not. Freedom must always be related to community and justice. Every community seeks consciously or unconsciously to make social peace and order the first goal of its life. It may pay a very high price in the restriction of freedom so as to establish order; but order is the first desideratum for the simple reason that chaos means non-existence. . . .

Order alone can, of course, be bought at a very high price, usually at too high a price from the standpoint of those classes in society who must pay it. The second goal of any society therefore is justice. Aristotle defined justice as "giving each man his due." Since in the long history of Western democracy no one has ever offered accurate criteria by which each man's due is measured, we must come to the conclusion that open societies have solved the problem by allowing a free competition of social forces, which enables every force in society to make its claims upon society and to acquire enough social and political power and prestige to enforce its claims.

And liberty and equality are generally recognized as the twin principles of justice. But abstract radical libertarianism and equalitarianism falsely regard them as simple historical possibilities. They cannot be simple possibilities. Liberty must be measured against the community's need for security against internal and external peril. Equality must be measured against the need for the hierarchy of social function by which a community integrates its life and work. That is why history has refuted both Jacobin libertarianism and Marxist equalitarianism.

Democracy itself did not emerge in Europe until the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. And it did not come to terms with the necessities of justice in industrial collectivism until the end of the nineteenth century. This tardiness was in fact the reason for the Communist rebellion against bourgeois civilization. I think we may understand more fully why it is wrong in the present hour to present democracy as a simple alternative to communism if we reflect upon this history, attempting to answer two questions. 1) Why did free institutions emerge in European culture so very late? And 2) Why was Europe tardy in establishing justice within the conditions of an industrial economy?

Democratic institutions emerged late for two primary reasons. High standards of literacy are required to prepare all classes to participate in the dialogue about justice, and particularly to enable the "lower classes" to make their claims and make them effective. The non-democratic European nations of our own day still lack this standard of literacy; we know that the "poor world" has not attained even the minimal standard . . .

If democracy derives political authority from the "consent of the governed," the governed must have at least minimal competence in judging the performance of their governors and in estimating their own place in the political organization.

But it is even more important to recall that the emergence of democracy in European culture depended on the development of forms of ethnic and linguistic homogeneity; on these depend communal cohesion. If these forms of the sense of kind and these instruments of communication are lacking, no free government can either create them or live without their influence for order. . . .

Obstacles to national unity

Now, if one surveys the non-European nations today, particularly the democratic ones, one must be struck by the ethnic and linguistic, rather than racial, hazards to national unity which most of them face. The language riots in India in 1956 prove that a sense of common race will not do when there is a linguistic conflict in which no language may prevail. Even Gandhi's immense authority was not able to establish Hindi as the dominant language in India, though it became the official one. English . . . was, until recently, the common language of the Indian bureaucracy, but modern education in various tongues is threatening the efficiency of the whole Indian political apparatus.

And many of the other Asian nations have comparable difficulties with the ethnic and linguistic bases of integral community. On a much lower level of culture, the forming nations of Africa demonstrate daily that so-called "African nationalism" is really a "pan-African" revolt of the black races against their former masters. There are not enough resources of literacy and communication-through-print to establish linguistic community. The confusion of dialects and tribal loyalties, of which the situation in the Congo is a vivid example rather than a unique phenomenon, makes clear that it is the pan-African sentiment of black men, together with sub-national tribal loyalties, that are at work here, stronger than the cohesive forces of nationalism. Free institutions can, in the words of the preamble of the American constitution, "establish

a more perfect union." But they must presuppose some other kind of union, some force of loyalty below conscious political contrivance. . . .

If ethnic and linguistic homogeneity are prerequisites for community below the level of conscious political contrivance, then tolerance amid a diversity of religions and cultures would seem to be also. Habits of tolerance between different religious communities—which political freedom may encourage but cannot create—are necessary to make given cultural diversity compatible with national stability. But since it required at least two centuries to persuade the two warring versions of Christianity to live in a tolerably peaceful co-existence, one has some apprehensions about the ability of non-European nations, democratic or not, to establish political unity against the hazard of religious division. . . .

To sum up: many of the nations to whom we commend democracy quite obviously do not have the prerequisites of national unity which were fashioned in Europe before the rise of free governments. They therefore confront a hazard of greater dimension than any of the free European nations faced. . . .

Modern industrial cultures do not have the simple two-class social structure of bourgeoisie and proletariat which the Communist dogma affirms. They have a complex pattern of class interests. They have not, in fact, been able to achieve health without establishing a tolerable equilibrium of power between at least four classes: the class of landed wealth, the middle class of commercial and industrial owners, the industrial workers, and the men of the soil. Or more exactly, since landed wealth has been either liquidated in the rise of democracy (as it was in France) or has been non-existent (as in the new nations of America and the British Commonwealth) or has been gradually merged with the new commercial classes (as in Britain), modern free governments have had to achieve some kind of tolerable equilibrium of power among the three remaining classes. Of these, the men of the soil, whether Asian peasants or European yeomen or . . . Canadian farmers, appear to be the stuff of history rather than the creators of historical dynamic. . . .

Only two, then, of the four classes of Western history, the bourgeoisie and the industrial workers, have been politically dynamic. (If, by the way, there is a separate class of professional and intellectual leaders, it is usually related to one of these dynamic classes.) . . .

In timing the tardiness with which democracy came to terms with the necessities of justice in an industrial society and in tracing the forces and tendencies, deliberate or not, which made this possible, it is apparent that two political conditions were and are necessary. One is that the middle classes be strong and resolute enough either to break the mold of the traditional society dominated by landed wealth, or, as in Britain, to transform the old feudalism so that it would be compatible with the necessities of a commercial and industrial economy. The second condition is that the grant of new liberties and rights to the industrial workers should not be, though inevitably tardy and reluctant, so tardy as to prompt them to rebellion against the standards of democratic society themselves; they should rather be persuaded to participate in the pressures and counter-pressures of an open society; step by step,

Democracy In Latin America

they may gradually achieve the rights they desire and which the stability of the community requires. When these two conditions have not obtained in European history, democratic governments have not achieved health and maturity. Nor has democratic government been a success in non-European cultures without them. . . .

We know, . . . despite polemical slogans about the "Free World," that not all the nations which early aspired to democracy have succeeded, brilliantly or otherwise, in relating free institutions to the necessities of justice in an industrial society. The causes of their failure may have been many, but they always included two: a lack of resolution or political aptitude in the middle class to break the dominance of landed wealth; and an incapacity or unwillingness to include the other dynamic class, the workingmen, among the forces whose competitions establish the flexible equilibrium basic to democratic justice.

Consider the rather obvious failure of democracy in Latin America, where a litter of democratic constitutions has not prevented a long history of alternation between democracy and dictatorship of the right or left. Perhaps this failure, this feebleness of the democratic impulse, is best explained by the weakness of the two classes we have discussed and their inability to break the mold of a feudal-agrarian economy, even with the force of new industrial wealth. Mexico alone has a half-century of democratic stability under a one-party government, a government which does not suppress civil rights and tries with fair success to be loyal to the ideals of the revolution. . . .

In sum, if Latin American nations fall prey to dictatorship, they can only be rescued by revolution. As in Cuba, the revolution may establish a dictatorship of the left. And the basic program of leftist revolutions is almost always land reform. In the case of Cuba, Marxist radicalism and much resentment against American owners of property have prompted a complete nationalization of property, leaving the middle class supporters of the radical revolution with new resentments which may well generate a new revolution. The various classes of the nation are at such a social and economic distance from one another that the flexible adjustments of interests and subtle accommodations of rights which democracy requires become quite impossible.

But the prospects for democracy in Latin America, while dim, are more promising than in many nations of Asia and the Middle East. Egypt is of course under the domination of a military junta. It overturned the traditional monarchial society and promised, but is not likely to establish, a democratic regime in the near future. The poverty and illiteracy of the Egyptian *fellahin* and the irresponsibility of the political parties in the previous semi-democratic regime should offer the gravest doubts to democrats. The intellectuals, motivated by patriotic and other passions for social justice, find no effective middle class with which to become allied. They naturally drift to the army, the obvious center of power.

In Indonesia and in Iraq, a quasi-democratic regime functions with military power and Communist Party support in uneasy alliance. In Indonesia, the army seems momentarily to dominate. It is hazardous to

Democracy In Asia and the Middle East

The need for reassessment

make any predictions about the future of political institutions or of democratic prospects in such nations as Iran, where a comparatively enlightened monarchy tries to accomplish at last minimal land reform. But it is not hazardous to be wholly pessimistic about the prospects of nations such as Saudi Arabia; here oil wealth drawn from Western markets accentuates rather than mitigates the fantastic contrast between the profligate royal house and the abjectly poor peasants and the Bedouins of the desert kingdom.

Yet we need not despair. Surveying the difficulties which the democratic cause faced in Europe—before it triumphed—and surveying similar hazards which it faces in some non-European cultures—which make any imminent or even ultimate triumph of democratic government unlikely—should not prompt us to pessimistic conclusions, either about the *validity* of the common cause of the “Free World” in its contest with communism or about the possibility of the ultimate triumph of free institutions in this particular contest. It should rather persuade us to reassess the stakes of the struggle.

Such a reassessment must convince us that what we define as “dictatorship” or “despotism” is only a product or by-product of a more serious source of evil in communism. That evil is a pretentious scheme of world salvation, a secularized religious apocalypse, which foolishly divides the world between good and evil classes and nations, predicts the final triumph of the hosts of justice against those of injustice, and destines one class, the “proletariat,” to become the masters of the whole historic process, by taking “the leap from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom.”

If this absurd religious apocalypse should ever be implemented on a large scale, and should master the destinies of all the nations, mankind would face not only totalitarian government but a dangerous effort to press all the vitalities and forces, the hopes and aspirations of many nations, the cultural and ethical aspirations of sensitive individuals, into the restrictive and confining pattern of its scheme of world salvation. The Communist danger is, in short, much more grievous and perilous than we assume it to be if we define it simply as despotism.

On the other hand, we lay the basis for political embarrassment, and possibly despair, if we define our cause merely as the cause of democratic self-government. Our cause is the cause of freedom in a wider sense than that of democratic political institutions. We believe that history is a vast drama or series of dramas, in which individuals, communities, classes, races and cultures are engaged in winning their freedom from the limits and necessities of nature, even in exploiting and misusing their freedom in contest with other individuals and communities, in elaborating theme upon theme and dramatic configuration upon configuration. It is difficult to comprehend the whole series of dramas in any pattern of meaning. It is quite certainly impossible to contain such varied themes in the simple morality play between good and evil in which the Marxist dogma seeks to confine it.

In this contest with the Communist effort to master peoples and direct history, it is necessary that the nations at the inner circle of direction should have mastered both the philosophy of freedom and

the art of self-government. But it is a part of the philosophy of freedom to have regard for the varied stages of culture of different communities, and therefore not to expect them to attain a form of community which is beyond their political or moral capacities. This does not mean that a form of community in which a monopoly of power guarantees order can ever be regarded as a citadel of justice. But it does mean that we will not be tempted to despair if, on the fringes of the non-Communist world, we should see some serious defects in the attainment of democratic justice. We cannot, in short, regard democratic self-government as a simply attainable alternative to Communist totalitarianism.

Degrees of dictatorship

Dictatorships, military or otherwise, may be uncreative. Some sorts of dictatorship may merely represent the failure of a nation to achieve order in any other way. These cannot be regarded with complacency. But they are not as irrevocable as a Communist dictatorship, which is but the product and instrument of a religio-political dogmatic system with a fantastic ambition to master all the variegated processes of history and press all its themes into one mold, and which promises redemption from all social evil.

Obviously no nation or culture could with honor capitulate before such an absurd religio-political thrust at world dominion. It must be resisted. On the other hand, its pretensions are in such obvious contradiction to the multiple facts in the landscape of the world that, despite its momentary plausibility, there is the possibility that, meeting resistance, it will disintegrate among those facts, as will the ideological system which is the source of its prestige. There is therefore no reason to seek the elimination of the evil at the heart of communism by launching a nuclear war against it. This is particularly true since a nuclear war, beyond its tragic destruction of millions of lives, would create a political chaos which would postpone the refutation of communism's ideological system and extend the illusion of its relevance. Nor can an ideological system which promises to transmute redemption from catastrophe be defeated by the greatest catastrophe of human history.

Time is on our side

If this analysis of the contest should have any validity, it might seem to imply that old support of complacency, the assurance that "time is on our side." Yet I believe that it is on our side in the very long run. In the short run, the anti-Communist forces must contend not only against the handicaps and hazards which we have previously analyzed. They must also deal with a handicap essential to an international alliance which has no simple unifying dogma as the Communists have. It cannot coerce the nations in the alliance, nor keep them from pursuing policies which express their distinctive traditions and reveal both their strength and their weakness. . . .

The common cause which must be defended literally includes the whole of mankind and the right of all nations and peoples to develop their potentialities and fulfill their destinies without being restricted by the absurd pretension to omniscience of a single force in history, trying, vainly we hope, to secure the historical omnipotence which its pretended omniscience seems to warrant in its own esteem. Thus modern history has culminated in a dramatic encounter between dogma and common experience.

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


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